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Abstract: We assess the impact of the war on the Canadian economy both during and
after the end of hostilities. Canadian per capita income increased
dramatically during the war but declined sharply in the years thereafter. Part
of the pattern is explained by the increased agricultural exposure of the
Canadian economy, in particular, the Prairie wheat economy expansion.
Rising agricultural prices due to the war provided farmers with a windfall
profit sufficiently large to boost national income. The other impact was a
shift of resources into and within manufacturing. Canada supplied the bulk of
Allied shells and explosives. Much of capital newly engaged in wartime
production was rendered obsolete at wars end making the shift of postwar
manufacturing production into consumer durables very costly.
World War I was undoubtedly a major event in Canadian history, as was true of many
other countries. For Canada, again as for many other countries, it has widely been taken to
mark a breaking point in the countrys development. Politically, the nation matured with the
war experience, but economically the situation is less clear. Many of the particulars of how
Canada contended with the war have been amply described but there is no clear consensus as to
whether the war benefited the Canadian economy or whether it was a seriously costly
experience. The historical record is more descriptive than evaluative. There has been little
systematic macroeconomic analysis. Our motivation in writing this paper was two-fold. First, it
is evident to us that, in terms of real per capita income, Canada took a severe hit from the war
and its aftermath. It took the Canadian economy a dozen years to regain its prewar level of real
income per capita. Only Germany took longer. Secondly, the existing literature is ambiguous,
lacking agreement on some of the main points, and in some cases just wrong. Our hope is to
offer a clarification and a reinterpretation of the consequences for Canada of World War I. The
task is more extensive than can be dealt with in a single paper. While we think that we have
some important things to convey we realize that this paper is more in the nature of a research
agenda than a definitive statement.
Many of the particulars of how the Canadian economy coped with its involvement in
the war have been amply described by earlier writers.1 Where the existing literature remains
unsettled and unclear is on the judgmental questions. Economically, was the war, on net,
beneficial or detrimental to the Canadian economy? Some writers have claimed that the war
stimulated Canadian industrial development. Others have asserted that there were few lasting
gains. Hardly any have suggested that the war was an economic calamity, although some have
identified a reduction in the long-term rate of growth of the economy with the period of the
war.2 Some have argued that the war spurred the expansion of Canada as a wheat exporter.
Others have argued that this disadvantageously locked the Canadian economy into an
unfortunate reliance on wheat monoculture. To some writers the only people to gain were the
industrialists and capitalists. War profiteering is a popular theme. The losers are claimed to be
the workers and the farmers, or at least some of the farmers, and public sector employees.
Regionally, it is claimed that central Canada gained, the Maritimes lost, and western Canada
1 The most important contributors were Curtis, The Canadian Banks and War Finance, Deutsch, War Finance
and the Canadian Economy, Knox, Canadian War Finance and the Balance of Payments, and the Rowell-
Sirois Royal Commission Report.. Subsequent writers have drawn heavily on these basic works.
2 This literature is reviewed in greater detail below.
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came off disadvantaged as well. But not everyone agrees. There is a lot that needs to be
clarified.
Most previous writing on the topic appeared before good, annual statistics of national
income became available in the early 1990s.3 In this paper we shall rely heavily on these more
recently available statistics to try to provide a more thoroughly grounded, quantitatively based
account of what happened. A point to emphasize at the outset is that we look at a longer span of
time than most earlier writing. The important issue to us is not just what happened to Canada in
the actual years of conflict but what, in a broader and longer-term perspective, was the impact
on the Canadian economy. Canadas problems, we shall show, lay more in the readjustment to
the changed circumstances at the end of the war than to the war itself. On the surface at least, it
appears that Canadas problem was not so much the war but the peace. Still, the difficulties of
adjusting to the post-war situation had their roots in the way in which Canada contended with
the war and the way in which the world economy generally was transformed by the war.
I. Some Prominent and Well - Known Features of the Canadian War
Economy
Several prominent features of Canadas war experience have been well documented and are
matters on which there is general agreement. First off, the Canadian economy was able to
mobilize for war without undue strain. That was partly because it was able to make adaptations
in a remarkably elastic way, and partly because it was able to specialize and concentrate on a
few things that it could do well. Previous writers have placed considerable emphasis on the fact
that the war rescued the Canadian economy from a quite severe depression. The long and
vigorous boom that had propelled the Canadian economy for fifteen years prior to 1914 had
come to an end more than a year before the outbreak of war.4 In mid-1914 there was a high rate
of unemployment and considerable excess capacity.5 Canadians had been building a substantial
industrial base that by 1913 included a large iron and steel industry.6 At the same time it had
been settling a large territory on the Canadian plains that was emerging as one of the foremost
wheat growing regions of the world. With its participation in the war the Canadian effort to
3 The key resource is Urquhart, Gross National Product, Canada 1870-1926.
4The business cycle chronology provided by Chambers has a peak in November 1912. See E.J. Chambers, Late
Nineteenth Century Business Cycles in Canada.
5 This is based on conjectures from fragmentary evidence. There are no actual unemployment statistics for
Canada in this period.
6 What is not widely appreciated is that in 1913 only three countries in the world (the U.S., the U.K., and
Belgium) had greater net output per capita of manufactured goods. See Maizels, Industrial Growth and World
Trade.  On a per capita basis Canada produced more manufactures goods than did Germany. 
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increase production of goods needed for war was narrowly focused on a few items: foodstuffs,
explosives, and artillery rounds.
Canada had an insignificantly small military establishment and no pre-existing
munitions industry. It quickly enlisted a large number of men and mainly left it to the British to
equip them to fight.7 The rifles, the machine guns, the artillery pieces, and other items of
ordnance were supplied by Britain.8 As an element of the British Empire, Canada automatically
went to war when Britain declared and the Canadian Expeditionary Force was part of the
British army.9 In the matter of armaments, Canadian industry concentrated very largely on
artillery rounds and on chemical explosives.10 
The wartime expansion of the Canadian economy was an export boom focused quite
narrowly on foodstuffs (wheat more than anything else but also beef, pork and cheese), artillery
rounds, explosives, and non-ferrous metals. These were things that the economy was readily
able to produce. National income rose but the increase consisted almost entirely of those
exported items. 
Producing goods was one thing but financing the war effort was more of a challenge. It
could not be done through increased taxation and was achieved almost wholly by borrowing. In
that respect Canada did not differ from most of the other countries involved, but for Canada the
challenge was probably stiffer. The Government of Canada (the federal government) had a
rather primitive revenue structure as 90 per cent of its tax revenues came from customs tariffs
and excise taxes on a few items such as alcoholic beverages and tobacco. In that respect too
Canada was not much different from some of the other countries. What made the challenge
greater for Canada was that, with the outbreak of war, there was a huge drop in tariff revenues
as imports fell by 26 per cent. Prior to the war Canada had a large international trade deficit
financed by a historically outstanding inflow of capital. When war broke out the capital inflow
7 By wars end Canada had enlisted 629,000 men which made up 27 per cent of the 1911 male population 15 to
49 years of age. About 500,000 men in uniform were sent to Europe.
8 A well-known but rather poignant exception was the Ross rifle, manufactured at a plant in Quebec City.
Canadian soldiers were initially equipped with Ross rifles which were fine pieces for peacetime marksmen but
were quite unreliable under battlefield conditions Canadian soldiers, where possible, threw them away in
disgust, and picked up British Lee-Enfields As it was, the Ross factory was unable to deliver its rifles in
sufficient numbers. 
9 Other Canadians directly joined British military units. The Royal Flying Corps had many Canadian pilots,
including a large proportion of its top aces.
10 It is common in the literature to state that Canada produced shells. Complete or fixed rounds of artillery
munitions consist of the shell projectile, containing either explosive or shrapnel, the cartridge case into which
the shell is fit, the explosive material in the case, and a fuse. Eventually, Canadian industry produced fixed
rounds but, for the most part, especially in the early years of the war, Canada produced mostly just the shells.
This is explained in great detail by David Carnegie, The History of Munitions Supply.  Canada produced little in
the way of small arms ammunition.
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plummeted and along with it the flow of imports. New sources of revenue had to be found.
Tariff rates were increased, new excise taxes were imposed, an excess profits tax was
introduced, and eventually a personal income tax was enacted.11 All in all, these added only
modestly to government revenues. The Government of Canada had no recourse but to turn to
borrowing.
The problem was that access to the London capital market had been cut off and the
Canadian government had no experience with borrowing in New York. Furthermore, it had
never tried to sell bonds domestically.12 Initially the British government advanced the needed
funds, but by mid-1915 the British limited their financing to expenses incurred by the Canadian
forces overseas. At around the same time the British established the Imperial Munitions Board
(IMB) to buy munitions and foodstuffs in Canada.13 This agency, which was formally an arm of
the British government, had to borrow heavily from the Government of Canada. Over the
course of the war Canada became a substantial lender to Great Britain. The Canadian
government was essentially forced to innovate by turning to the domestic market for savings.
While the Government of Canada had never before tried to sell its bonds domestically to
Canadians, its War Bond issues were all vigorously oversubscribed.14 The first three bond
issues were taken up by a relatively small number of subscribers, but by the issue of November
1917 a mass market for bonds had been established.15 By the issue of October, 1918, a little
more than one million persons subscribed. This was at a time when Canadas population was
just eight million. Males over 20 years of age, potentially heads of households, numbered 2.5
million, and of those 500,000 were in uniform overseas. One might say that, roughly, about
one-half of Canadian households subscribed to these bond issues.16 Somewhat to its surprise,
then, the Government of Canada had succeeded in establishing a domestic market for its bonds.
That has long been looked upon as a stellar feature of accounts of the Canadian economy in
World War I.
11 The details of these changes are thoroughly described by Deutsch, War Finance,  and have been well
rehearsed by most subsequent writers.
12 Why should it have when cheap capital had been readily available in London?
13 The organization and operation of the IMB is documented in details by Carnegie The History of Munitions
Supply. and Michael Bliss, A Canadian Millionaire.  Carnegie was a member of the IMB; the book by  Bliss
covers the career of Joseph Flavelle who was the chairman and director of the IMB.
14 Full details are given by Curtis The Canadian Banks. He notes that about one-fifth of the second, 1916
issue, was taken up by U.S. investors. That issue elicited twice as many subscribers as were accepted. 
15 Fewer than one-half of the subscribers were accepted but the average bond purchase was barely one-tenth
($485) that of the first (November 1915) issue.
16 Of course the number might actually have been smaller if eager buyers subscribed through more than one
agency, knowing that not all subscribers were being accepted. We cannot tell that from the statistics.
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While the Government of Canada financed its war expenditures by borrowing, it also
resorted to inflating the currency. That has also been a well documented part of the standard
story. Canada abandoned the tie to gold at the outbreak of the war and declared Dominion notes
to be legal tender. It then proceeded substantially to expand its note issue. What made this more
serious is that the banks could treat Dominion notes, like gold, as reserves. Under the Finance
Act the banks could add to their reserves as they wished by obtaining advances of Dominion
notes on the pledge of government securities. The money supply became effectively demand
determined, limited only by whatever caution the banks exercised in their lending practices.
Consequently, the price level rose in Canada but to an extent that was not out of line with other
countries involved in the war. In Canada, as elsewhere, the price level continued to rise after
the war was over and prices of 1920 can be compared with those of 1913. With 1913=100, the
Canadian consumer price index stood at 189 in 1920. That compares with 202 for the U.S.,
which was only briefly in the war, 253 for the U.K., 331 for France, and Germany at 1002.
Non-combatants fared no better  Switzerland (224), Denmark (269), Sweden (274). Australia
did a little better at 152.17 Writers on Canadian history all emphasize that Canada inflated.
Indeed it did, but so did all of the involved countries, and Canada came off relatively well.
So much for what is well known about the Canadian economy in World War I, and
what has been well documented, but what issues are in dispute or have been overlooked?
II. Issues in Dispute
There appears to be little agreement about the overall effect of World War I on the Canadian
economy. Some writers give the impression that Canada generally benefited. Others view the
experience as an unfortunate one for Canada, while still others offer no overall judgement but
just relate the particulars given in the previous section of this paper. The general historians tend
to paint an optimistic picture, emphasizing the great surge in exports and claiming that the war
enhanced Canadian manufacturing industry.18 The enthusiasm of the historians is partly a carry-
over from political considerations, where World War I is thought to mark an important positive
step in Canadas political and constitutional development. It also reflects a common
misperception that Canada had not successfully industrialized before the early twentieth
17 Consumer price indexes from Mitchell, International Historical Statistics. 
18 Typical of this view are Brown and Cook , Canada, 1896-1921,  who view the war as stimulating the
economy. This standard history of Canada in these years by intention focuses entirely on the war years
themselves and does not look into the aftermath. The book covers the period up to 1921 but on war-related
topics the discussion does not go past 1919. 
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century.19 Other historians are less favorably impressed by the consequences of the war.
Bothwell, Drummond and English admit that the war economy fostered industrial expansion
but emphasize that after the war the Canadian economy stagnated and went into depression.20
They duly note the large increase in exports of agricultural products but claim that this was
anything but a bonanza for western wheat farmers. They are reflecting the judgement of
Thompson, the pre-eminent historian of the consequences of the war for the prairie wheat
economy.21 Thompson claims that the war induced a large increase in acres sown to wheat in
western Canada, but that in the long run this was a disadvantageous development and that it did
not even benefit farmers in the short run because their increased revenues were eaten up by
rising costs, and the expansion induced them to adopt deleterious farm practices. That argument
has been adopted by many other writers.
The more specifically economic historians have not provided much clarification. They
have not so far given us a full-scale quantitative analysis. The main thing that can be said is that
their discussions of World War I have been remarkably thin. The Easterbrook and Aitken
textbook, which ruled supreme in Canada for decades, tells us very little about World War I
and mainly views it as a transitory export boom.22 In their view it mainly allowed the Canadian
economy to continue along the path of development that it had successfully been following for
many years before the war. Theirs is a story of continuity, not discontinuity. The more recent
text of Marr and Paterson does not even have an index entry for World War I but it does note in
passing that the general effect of the First World War on the economy was to extend the
prosperity of the prewar economy, but they go on to recognize that there was a problem in the
aftermath and that the prairie agricultural economy was over-extended beyond any level
sustainable in peacetime.23 That sort of acknowledgment of benefit to the economy, but with
reservations, seems to be characteristic of the economic historians. The currently popular
textbook by Norrie, Owram and Emery emphasizes the stimulative effects during the war itself
while pointing out that these benefits were mostly transitory. They review skeptically the
longer term effects, both positive and negative, claimed by other writers.24
19 The influential Rowell-Sirois Royal Commission wrote of the war as propelling the Canadian economy
toward industrial maturity. A strongly contrasting view is offered by McInnis, Just How Industrialized Was the
Canadian Economy in 1890? 
20 Canada, 1900-1945.
21 John H. Thopmson, The Harvests of War
22 W.T. Easterbrook and Hugh G.J. Aitken, Canadian Economic History
23 William Marr and Donald Paterson, Canada: An Economic History, p. 390.
24 Norrie, Owram and Emery, A History of the Canadian Economy, pp. 276-282.
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One outcome that draws the attention of most writers on the Canadian experience with
World War I is the claim of a large, inegalitarian shift in the distribution of income. This is
another emphasis that stems from the report of the Rowell-Sirois Commission. Its authors saw
business and industry gaining large profits and, while admitting that some farmers and some
workers may have gained, claim that the bulk of the common people were disadvantaged.
Subsequent writers have mostly adopted that same theme. Nominal wage increases were
thought to have been eroded by the rise in the cost of living. Grain farmers in western Canada
enjoyed soaring prices but their costs went up as well. Moreover, the higher prices, it is
claimed, led them to incur more debt, and induced them to expand their production capacity.
Farmers elsewhere in Canada, who outnumbered those in the Prairie Provinces by 2½ to one,
are generally overlooked, or thought to have received little benefit from wartime
circumstances.25
With so many supposed losers in the war-induced redistribution, the gains to the
profiteers and such must have been really large, but we have little information to support that.
A lot seems to be based on supposition. Wars are supposed to be rife with profiteering. One
interesting line of argument that has been offered is that the very triumph of the creation of a
domestic bond market to carry the debt burden of the war benefited a small class of rentiers
who reaped the interest.26
Other writers have shifted the issue of primary interest from whether the war and its
aftermath was on net a burden or a benefit to whether it marked a significant break in the
development of the Canadian economy. For one reason or another many writers have thought
that to be the case. That is consistent with an international literature that accepts 1913 or 1914
as a fundamental point of change in the world economy.27 For Canada the issue has become a
matter of contention among practitioners of modern time series analysis. A unit root is
displayed by the Canadian time series of GNP or GNP per capita, unless the series is
segmented. Writers have differed, however, on whether World War I comprises a significant
25 Bothwell, Drummond and English, Canada, 1900-1945, p. 172, are notable exceptions. They accept the
common judgement that Prairie farmers gained little, if anything, on net (the war was anything but a bonanza
for western wheat farmers but, without offering any evidence, assert that the real beneficiaries were the farmers
in Ontario.
26 We have found no one applauding this as a shift from benefiting British to benefiting Canadian rentiers. Why
bond holders, as lenders, should have come off so well in a period when inflation is claimed to have played such
a role in diminishing the incomes of farmers and wage earners is also a query that seems not to have addressed. 
27 Notably, the recently published Cambridge Economic History of the United States defines the long
nineteenth century as ending in 1913. One might have thought the U.S. economy to have been least likely to
have been affected by the experience of the First World War.
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break point in the long run trend. Inwood and Stengos found that assuming a break point in
1914 restores stationarity to a segment of the trend.28 Others favor 1929 but not 1914.29 Still
others have identified a significant break in 1917 or in 1920.30 If nothing else, these studies
display the peril in placing so much emphasis on breaks in trend in an individual year. Using a
somewhat different technique, Terrence Mills shows that over the entire period from 1914 to
1940 the Canadian economy grew at a much lower rate than in the pre-war period.31 More
conventional historians, without the aid of sophisticated statistical analysis, have disputed
whether the episode of World War I constituted any fundamental break in the pattern of
Canadian economic growth. The long-dominant textbook of Easterbrook and Aitken may have
given so little attention to World War I because they viewed it as merely a transitory export
boom, bringing little fundamental change to the nature of the Canadian economy, its policies,
and its dynamic.32 More recently McCalla has asked whether World War I marked a
fundamental change in the nature of the Canadian economy and concluded, very much like
Easterbrook and Aitken, that it did not.33
III. The Record of Real Per Capita Income
A good starting point in an assessment of the impact of the war on the Canadian economy is the
record of what happened to real per capita GNP. The economy is all about material well being
and so we should ask how the war affected material well being, both in the short run and in the
long run. Real per capita GNP is the best gauge we have of that. Previous writers have not
systematically looked at that evidence.34 Figure 1 shows Canadian per capita real GNP over the
years from 1911 to 1926. The most striking feature is the long lag in Canadas recovery to the
pre-war level of income. It was not until 1925 that Canada got back to where it had been in
28 Kris Inwood and Thanasos Stengos, Discontinuities in Canadian economic growth
29 Baldev Raj, International evidence on persistence; A. Serletis, The random walk in Canadian output.
30 For 1917, David Greasley and Les Oxley, A tale of two dominions; for 1920, Lews Evans and Neil Quigley,
What can univariate models tell us.
31 Mills, Recent developments in modelling trends and cycles. His study also shows the pre-1914 growth rate
to be resumed in Canada in the early 1950s.
32 In light of this one might wonder why time series analysts selected the outbreak of World War I to be tested as
a significant break point in Canadian economic growth. 
33 Douglas McCalla, The Economic Impact of the Great War. 
34 Actually, J. J. Deutsch in War Finance and the Canadian Economy provided a series of nominal GNP
figures for Canada for the years 1911 through 1920. These were prepared for the Rowell-Sirois Royal
Commission on Dominion-Provincial relations. Deutsch did not deflate these to reflect real income nor did he
present per capita figures. That is perhaps why subsequent writers rarely used them. Reliable annual estimates of
pre-1926 Canadian GNP became available only with the 1993 publication of M.C. Urquharts Gross National
Product, Canada, 1870-1926. One should perhaps not overstate the reliability of Urquharts deflated series
although for the years after 1911 it should not be too bad. 
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1913.35 A dozen years of no growth is a serious set-back to an economy. It is common to think
of Canadian performance relative to the United States. The Canadian level of income had
converged on that of the U.S. in the years before World War I, and in 1913 stood at 84 per cent
of the U.S. level. That was a striking gain because it occurred over a period in which the U.S.
was one of the world leaders in industrialization and growth. In 1925 Canadian income was
back to the 70 per cent  ratio where it was in 1870. In the aftermath of World War I Canada had
lost all of the gain that it had made on the U.S. Canadian income slid even in comparison with
the U.K. By 1913 per capita income in Canada had reached 90 per cent  of the level of the U.K.
In 1925 it was back to 84 per cent.
Assessed in terms of what happened to real per capita income, and how long it took
income to recover to the pre-war level, World War I and its aftermath seems to have been more
costly to Canada than to any of the other of the main participants except Germany (See Figure
2). France and Belgium had surpassed their 1913 levels by 1922. Australia was back to its pre-
war level by 1923. In the United States per capita income rose to 107 per cent  of the 1913 level
in 1918 and 1919, sagged back to the 1913 level in the depression year of 1921, and by 1925
was 19 per cent  above the level of 1913. The U.K. got back up to its 1913 level only in 1924,
but income there did not fall as low as in Canada.
For Canada it was not so much the war itself as the aftermath that hit so hard. We argue
that the experience was all of a piece. The difficult adjustment to the conditions altered by the
war was a direct outgrowth of the war itself. It was not just that the world economy had
changed, as many writers have recognized, but that, internally, the way in which Canada
responded to the war laid the basis for the difficult years afterward and the slow recovery made
to the pre-war level of income. Canada escaped the devastation of a war fought on its soil. The
commitment of resources it made to the war effort was lighter than most of the other
combatants. Still, economically, Canada came off very badly. The war was a very costly one
for this country.
Canada had gone into the war in 1914 in economically depressed condition. Per capita
income  had fallen nine per cent from 1913 (the same extent as in the US). Thereafter, as
Canada responded to the strong demands of the war effort, income rose, reaching 108 per cent
35 That statement, and Figure 1, are drawn directly from Urquhart, Gross National Product, Canada, Table 1.6.
The comparative data on GDP per capita in what follows are all derived from Angus Maddison. In Maddisons
tables the Canadian income level does not get above 1913 until 1926. In 1925 he has Canada still at 98 per cent
of the 1913 level. In 1926 it rises to 101. So as not to overstate our case we shall stick with 1925 as the recovery
year.
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of the 1913 level in 1917. Much of that income gain might be accounted for by the huge
increase in exports of wheat and wheat flour, of beef, pork and cheese, and of shells and
explosives. In 1915 the increased value of those exports alone was slightly more than the whole
increase in GNP.36 The ratio declined over the war years as other segments of the economy
expanded, but in 1917 the increase in exports still amounted to 59 per cent as much as the rise
in GNP, and the increase for the few specified goods was still 72 per cent of the increase in
total exports.37 Exports by major categories are presented in Figure 3.38 Broadly speaking, then,
Canadian income rose during the first three years of the war because Canadians were able
substantially to increase exports of a few products. That those were materials to support a
destructive military action does not detract from their representing an increase in income.39
Canada was feeding Britain. It had been exporting to supply the British with food before the
war, but during the war too much shipping would be tied up to rely on the more distant
suppliers -- Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand. Non-combatant countries such as Denmark
and the Netherlands were feeding Germany. Exports are exports and add positively to national
income. From the point of view of making welfare judgements the important question is what
was done with the export proceeds. What happened to imports? In the case of Canada they fell,
substantially, by about one-quarter. After 1915 imports rose again and, valued in constant 1913
prices, got back above the 1913 level by 1917, only to fall below again in the following year.40
The increase in imports during the war years were largely made up of coal, tin, crude
petroleum, raw cotton, and a category identified simply as military items (which rose to 13.6
per cent of the 1917 total). The biggest decline in imports was in machinery of all types. 
For Canada, from a peak in 1917, per capita income declined to 1918 and thereafter it
was all downhill. It was the aftermath of war, getting out of wartime production and export
conditions and getting back into peacetime circumstances that proved to be so problematic. It
36 Those few commodities accounted for 92 per cent of the increase in exports and the increase in all exports was
equivalent to 102.4 per cent of the increase in GNP. Of course these are not conceptually directly comparable
aggregates but the comparison is indicative of the dimensions of change. To produce those increased exports
there had to be some increase in imports as well, most notably coking coal.
37 It should be pointed out that much of the increased value of wheat exports can be attributed to the much
higher price of wheat. The current dollar GNP figure has to be deflated for the 31.3% price level increase that
occurred between 1913 and 1917. The problem is that the rise in the prices of wheat and other exported food
stuffs was a fairly large element of the overall rise in prices.
38 The large category Miscellaneous contains the value of shells.
39 One cannot escape the irony, however, of so much of those exports being artillery shells. At one point Canada
was supplying more than one quarter of the artillery shells being used by the British army. Canadians had
perfected the creeping barrage and, given the relatively high incidence of friendly fire some fraction of those
shells were going to kill Canadians. So much for trying to make welfare judgements.
40 Real export and import numbers are from Historical Statistics of Canada, series F295 and F297.
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was then that Canada performed so weakly. There was a notable depression in 1921, following
upon a couple of years of post-war inflation. Judged by change in per capita income this was
more a North American than world wide phenomenon. The U.S. experienced a dip in income
but bounced right back and went on to further growth. By 1925, the year when Canada finally
regained its 1913 level, the U.S. was 19 per cent  above where it had been in 1913. France had
a dip in 1921 but rebounded the following year to above its 1913 attainment, and by 1925 was
20 per cent higher than where it had been in 1913. Belgium just went right on rising from the
low level it had fallen to in 1918. It too was above the 1913 level by 1922 and in 1925 was up
11 per cent. In Australia per capita income had been depressed through the war and into 1920,
but recovery began in 1922 and by 1923 Australia was back to its 1913 level and by 1925 was
up 8 per cent. In the U.K. war production had pushed up per capita income throughout the war
so that by 1918 it was 11 per cent higher than at the outbreak. Peace brought a fall in income in
1919 and the U.K. also had a slow recovery. It regained its 1913 level only in 1924 but by 1925
was five per cent higher.
One might wonder why it should have been that income fell in Canada in 1918. That
year was a particularly bad one for the European countries on whose soil the war was being
fought but income did not fall in the United States nor in the United Kingdom. Why, then, did
it fall in Canada before the end of the war?41 By 1918 Canadian industry was already cutting
back on munitions production.42 There was also a decline in construction activity. The building
of war-related projects was winding down several months before the war actually came to an
end. There was also a notable decline in GDP originating in the transport sector.43 The big
change, however, was in agriculture. Exports of wheat plummeted in 1918. A small part of that
41 Real per capita income dropped by 7.5 per cent in one year. That is partly a result of the adjustment for
inflation. The price level rose by 13 per cent, but this was not an acceleration of inflation. The previous year
prices had gone up by 18 per cent. This was not just a technical drop in income. 
42 This was in part a consequence of the U.S. entry into the war. A condition was placed on British borrowing
that proceeds had to be used for purchases in the U.S. That was amended to allow Canadian producers to
participate on the condition that their prices were adjusted downward by 7 per cent. Some Canadian munitions
producers began to move their plants south of the border.
43 This was despite it being a time when other sectors still showed increases in output due to rising prices.
Railway freight rates had been frozen and so, to some extent, freight services were being valued at artificially
low prices. The main source of change, though, appears to come from a questionable change in the measurement
of output originating in the transport sector. After 1917 there was a shift from the railways having positive
undistributed profits to what Alan Green, in his measurement of railway GDP, calls negative savings. A large
segment of the Canadian railway system was taken over by the government and the system as a whole had come
to be subsidized by the government. The attribution of railway negative savings to the transport sector charges
that sector with the subsidy. The usual procedure is attribute subsidies to the economy as a whole in an
adjustment to the aggregate (indirect taxes less subsidies) The Urquhart national income series makes this
aggregate adjustment, but in so doing may have double counted the subsidies to the railway sector, which in the
Canadian case were large. This is an issue that needs a thorough examination and clarification. 
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was a shift toward milling in Canada as flour exports remained high, and actually reached an
all-time peak in 1918. Putting the two together exports of wheat and wheat flour declined by 57
per cent, and this was a big item in the national economy. The decline in the value of wheat and
flour exports was 27 per cent greater than the overall decline in GNP. The fall in wheat exports
and the decline in GNP in 1918, however, were just a prelude to the  struggles of the Canadian
economy over the next several years as it came to grips with problems inherited from the war
experience. 
To gain a fuller appreciation of the changes in the Canadian economy over the whole
period 1913 to 1925 we turn to an examination of the sources of change in Canadian GNP. We
identify the expanding and the declining sectors of the economy in each of three periods. The
periodization is based on the pattern of change in real per capita GNP. We look at the rise from
1913 to 1917, then at the decline from 1917 to 1921, and finally at the recovery from 1921 to
1925. This is essentially an exercise in mining the components of the Urquhart national income
data. It has not previously been done and should be helpful in pointing to what was happening
to the Canadian economy.44
IV. The Structure of Change in Canadian GNP Through Three
Periods of War and Recovery
This section is detailed and descriptive. Previous writing on Canada in World War I has
been selective, fairly brief, and except for discussions of finance, had provided little
quantitative evidence. With the detailed components of national income now available, that
evidence can now be used to get a more thorough look at how the economy changed. The main
question lying behind this exercise is to gain some understanding of why the Canadian
economy was so slow to recover after the war was over. The real cost of the war to Canada was
twelve years of no increase the level of income. That is a sorry interlude for an economy that
over the long run has had one of the most successful experiences of economic growth of any
country. The procedure in what follows is to look at change over each of the three periods in
the value added by sector, and in some cases by sub-sector. The evidence is presented in tables
that have a common format. Data are presented in three columns that consist of the nominal
dollar change in sectoral output, that change as a per cent of base period output, and the
44 The brief treatment by Green of the World War I experience is based on the same evidence and is generally
consistent with the account given here. See Alan Green, Twentieth Century Canadian Economic History, pp.
204-209.
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sectoral change of the first column as a per cent of the total change in GDP This last column is
to avoid undue emphasis on large percentage changes in sectors that represent only small parts
of the economy.45 The extent of overall price change is stated in the discussion of each period.
It will be seen that when all is said and done the story can be simplified to a large extent. What
happened to the economy was essentially a story of wheat and munitions. The extent to which
that was so needs to be detailed, though, and readers might also wonder about what was going
on elsewhere in the economy.
IV.A. From 1913 to the Wartime Peak in 1917
From 1913 to the wartime peak in 1917 GNP rose 50.6 per cent. The larger part of that was due
to the increase in the price level of 31 per cent Canadian national income rose, as did that of
many of the other participants in the war, but real income in 1917 was only 15 per cent higher
than in 1913 and in per capita terms the increase was only eight per cent. As has already been
pointed out national income had already begun to fall before the war was over and in 1918 real
per capita income was back at the 1913 level. The war brought an expansion of the Canadian
economy but it was not a large expansion. The expansion was very uneven, however, and it is
the change in structure in the economy revealed in Table 1 that is most interesting.
Table 1: Change in GDP by Sector, 1913 -1917
change % change % of total
($ millions) change in GDP
Gross Domestic Product 1342 + 50.6 100.0
Agriculture 418 + 81.0 31.1
Forestry 14 + 55.5 1.0
Fishing, hunting & trapping 11 + 55.2 0.8
Mining 35 + 43.1 2.6
Manufacturing 442 + 85.4 32.9
Gas & electric 10 + 44.9 0.7
Transport 14 + 5.6 1.0
Communication 7 + 42.5 0.5
Construction - 98 - 44.4 - 7.3
Banking and finance 6 + 4.8 0.4
Federal government 214 + 424.4 15.9
Other government & education 25 + 27.9 1.9
House rent 22 + 12.1 1.6
Trade and services 152 + 33.8 11.3
45 The data are in nominal values because we lack sector-specific price deflators There is a GDP deflator but
using it would simply multiply all sectors by the same adjustment factor.
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The really big expansions came in three sectors: federal government (not surprisingly),
agriculture, and manufacturing. Those three sectors account for 80 per cent of the total
expansion of GDP. Federal government output grew by an amount that is just slightly larger
than the amount of military wages in 1917.46 It has already been pointed out that, apart from a
half-million soldiers, Canadas big contribution to the war effort came in the form of exports of
foodstuffs and munitions. That is seen in the prominent expansion of the agriculture and
manufacturing sectors. Resources were withdrawn most notably from construction. Canada had
been undergoing a capital investment boom prior to the war and that had involved a lot of
construction, especially of railways and urban infrastructure. What is somewhat surprising is
that with so much more farm output and steel-intensive munitions to be moved, the transport
sector had almost no expansion.47
The increase in agricultural output was one of the foremost changes and needs to be
looked at with care since there have been some misconceptions as to precisely what happened.
A condensed account of structural change in agricultural output is given in Table 2. It shows
the change in the nominal value of farm revenues from the leading products.48
Table 2: Change in Farm Revenues, 1913-1917
Change % change change as % of
Ag sector total 
Total farm revenue 465  77.8 --
Wheat 239 173.2 51.4
Small grains 26 110.7 5.6
Potatoes and vegetables 40 95.7 8.6
Eggs 13 41.3 2.9
Cattle 49 65.7 10.6
Hogs 13 21.7 2.9
Cheese 20 104.2 4.3
Butter and fluid milk 35 46.7 7.5
Table 2 makes clear that the big story is of wheat production. That is indeed the way the story
46 Urquhart, Gross National Product, p. 601 gives wartime wages and salaries paid through the militia
department as $211 million in the fiscal year ending in March, 1918.
47 This would, at least in part, have been because much of the capital construction on railways was counted as
output of the transport sector. Railway freight rates were also frozen and so transport output was being valued at
artificial prices. In addition, there is the point already raised that government subsidization of railways was
charged against the transport sector as negative savings.
48 At the time of World War I Canadian farm purchases of inputs from other sectors were relatively small. That
can be seen by noting that the change in farm revenues was $465 million while the change in value added in
agriculture was $418 million. Farm revenues are defined as sales plus human consumption on farms.
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has usually been told. Before examining that, however, we should note that wheat accounted
for only one-half of the increased revenues of farmers. Other products, notably small grains,
beef cattle and cheese, contributed importantly to the increase in the value of agricultural
output. These products represent regional specialties. Wheat was pre-eminently the product of
farmers in the Prairie provinces. They also raised cattle. Cheese, cattle and to some extent
barley and oats (the principal small grains) were the products of eastern Canada. The point here
is that the regional distribution of gains or costs of war to farmers has been a matter of
disagreement.
The most important point to raise in connection with Table 2 is that the gains in farm
revenues were almost entirely a consequence of increased prices of farm products, not of
increases in physical output. Of the products shown only beef cattle and cheese had significant
increases in physical output. Wheat output was actually lower in 1917 than in 1913, as was the
output of small grains. Numbers of hogs sold or slaughtered were also down. Farmers enjoyed
increased revenues during World War I mainly because the prices of their products went up,
not because they produced more.
The way the story has conventionally been told the main response of Canadian farmers
was substantially to increase acreage planted to wheat in the Prairie region. Many writers have
repeated the statement by Deutsch that The acreage in field crops rose from 35 million in 1913
to 53 million in 1919, an increase which was equal to that which had taken place during the
twenty years prior to 1913. In the Prairie Provinces the acreage devoted to wheat rose by 80 per
cent in six years.49 That sounds like a dramatic response to the war. On the other hand the
number of bushels of wheat available for sale in 1917 was no greater than in 1913.50 In 1919,
the terminal date selected by Deutsch, Canadian wheat production was down 27 per cent below
1913. Nature had a hand to play in this. Wheat production on the Canadian Prairies is
notoriously variable. Farmers there were favored by a bumper crop in 1915. Output was up 70
per cent over what it had been in 1913. From 1917 through 1919 there were very poor crops.
Output was down substantially; but prices had soared by more than enough to offset the decline
in output. The farm gate price of wheat in the Prairie region, which had been 67.6 cents per
bushel in 1913 jumped to 201.9 cents in 1917.51  For Prairie farmers the main consequence of
49 J.J. Deutsch, War Finance, p. 534.
50 See Urquhart, Gross National Product, Table 2.1, p. 147.
51 Prices are from Urquhart, Gross National Product, p. 147. The price of wheat remained at almost as high a
level for the next three years. I should also be pointed out that the 1913 price was depressed. It is doubtful that
wheat farming was profitable at prices below 70 cents.
16
World War I was a remarkable windfall in the form of a more than doubling of the price of
their main product.
The acreage of grain crops in western Canada did indeed increase over the years of the
war, although from 1913 to 1919 by 57 per cent, not the 80 per cent claimed by Deutsch.52 As
has been pointed out by McCalla, this increase is not out of line from the rates of increase of
the dozen years of rapid settlement preceding 1913.53 The all-time peak of immigration to
Canada was in 1913. Many of those immigrants intended to become farmers on Canadas
western plains. The greatest increase in farm acreage in western Canada was just underway as
war broke out. It is not obvious that the war had an appreciable effect. The war years appear to
make little difference to the time pattern of acres seeded to wheat in Figure 4. The issue can be
tested more formally with a Nerlove-type partial adjustment model,
st  st-1 = a + b * st-1 + c * pt-1 + d * yieldt-1 + e * wart + ut
where st is acreage seeded in year t, pt is the price of wheat, yieldt is the per acre yield of grain,
and wart is a vector of four dummy variables for the years 1915 through 1918.54 Because there
is ultimately a maximum area optimally to utilize, the greater the amount seeded in any one
year, the less will be the increase in the following year. The error structure is assumed to be
autoregressive of order 1 so a Prais-Winsten transformation is used.55
The results in Table 3 indicate that lagged price and lagged seeded acreage are
statistically significant while lagged yield is not statistically significant. The signs on the
coefficients of st-1 and pt are as hypothesized. Farmers responded to higher prices by seeding
more acreage, but as acreage seeded increased the increment to seeded acreage declined. That
yields prove insignificant suggests that yields were a random draw, dependent on weather.
None of the dummy variables are individually statistically significant, nor are they statistically
significant when taken together. Therefore the onset of war, in and of itself, had no statistically
significant effect on acreage seeded even though exports in 1915 were double what they had
been in 1913. The increased exports were the result of an unusually large crop. For the
remainder of the war, however, production was nowhere near so large and exports were smaller
52 See footnote 49. Wheat acreage statistics are from Historical Statistics of Canada, series L-125. The crop
years reported there refer to the crops of the preceding calendar year.
53 The two preceding years also had heavy immigration. Altogether in 1911, 1912, and 1913 1.1 million
immigrants arrived in Canada. In those same years 116,000 new homesteads were claimed in a region that in
1911had barely 200,000 farms.
54 Data on acreage seeded and yields for the three Prairie provinces are from Strange (19xx). The real wheat
price is obtained as the price of No. 1 Northern from series L98 (Urquhart and Buckley, 1966) divided by the
wholesale price index for Vegetable products from series J36 (Urquhart and Buckley, 1966).
55 Durbins alternate test rejected the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.
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as well. However, the price farmers received for their wheat went up by 66 per cent in 1916
and by another 37% the following year. The increased value of wheat exports after 1915 was,
therefore, entirely a consequence of rising prices, essentially a windfall to those engaged in
wheat production.





















Note: See text for descriptions.
Standard errors in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
 ** Significant at the 5% level.
  * Significant at the 10% level.
While the war did not have a direct effect on acreage seeded to the principal cash crop,
wheat, some have asserted that the war did work to the detriment of wheat farmers by inducing
poor farming practice. Farmers have been characterized as having given up all prudence in
pursuing the large windfall available to grain producers. Thompson argues that farmers were
induced to extreme monoculture, forcing them exclusively into wheat production, eschewing
diversification.56 The Canadian plains, however, had been settled mainly for the purpose of
producing its most profitable crop  wheat, and that crop had become substantially more
56 Thompson, The Harvests of War, pp. 60-61.
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profitable. There is no evidence to suggest that farmers on the Prairies were diversifying prior
to the war as crop mixes and livestock herd sizes remained unaffected by the war. The average
number of animals per Prairie farm increased from the census date 1911 over the course of the
war. Cattle and sheep herd sizes kept increasing steadily. The only possible exception is hogs.
Numbers of hogs per farm increased to 1916, but declined thereafter, bottoming out in 1920.
But demand for bacon due to war outstripped Canadian supply and as a consequence hog
stocks were drawn down.
Thompson also suggests that farmers practiced poor technique to increase yields in the
short run thereby shortsightedly sacrificing yields in the longer run.57 These include expansion
onto sub-marginal land, burning of stubble, and planting of too much land on stubble.  Average
prairie wheat yields do look alarming, declining steadily from their peak in 1915 of 26 bu/acre
to a low of 9.3 bu/acre in 1919. One specific accusation is that farmers reduced acreage
summerfallowed in order to increase production in the short run but in so doing impaired long-
run yields. There is some evidence that farmers did overwork their land, as the ratio of acreage
seeded on land previously summerfallowed to total acreage seeded fell from 1914 through
1917.58 However, this effect alone could not have accounted for the dramatic decline in yields
as the acreage summerfallowed fell from 28% in 1914 to 18% in 1917 before recovering to
24% the following year.
The decline in yields for four years in succession is unusual, and was then
unprecedented on the Prairies. However, yields declined again during the Depression. From
their peak in 1928, yields remained low through 1937. While there was no repeat period with
four years of successive declines, because yields for 1933, 1934 and 1935 were uniformly low
and differed by less the 1 bu/acre, yields did not rise appreciably for a period of five years from
1932 through 1937. They remained essentially constant at low levels or they declined. Weather
cycles appear to have been responsible for the extended period of decline. In fact by historical
accident much land in the southern Prairies was settled during a period of unusually high
precipitation.59 When the drier part of the cycle returned, land that had been within the margin
57 Thompson, The Harvests of War, pp.66-67.
58 Thompson, The Harvests of War, p. 67 suggests reduced summerfallow persisted until 1919, but the data
indicate the ratio of summerfallow to seeded acreage reached its minimum in 1917. Unfortunately, data are
available from 1913 only (Saskatchewan, Department of Agriculture).
59 The area of southwestern Saskatchewan and southeastern Alberta known as Pallisers triangle was assessed
favorably for crops prior to settlement, although those initial assessments also indicated that the lands were
subject to cyclical drought. As it turned out, the early assessment was overly optimistic yet in more recent times
large wheat crops have been produced in parts of that region.
19
of cultivation became sub-marginal. There was in fact more farm abandonment on the Prairies
in the period immediately after the war when it first became apparent that some lands were
subject to cyclical drought than there was through the Depression years of the 1930s.
There was substantial farm size growth over this period. Prairie farms were distributed
initially as 160 acre homesteads. Given the technology and the climate, 160 acres was well
below optimal size. A single farm family with 4 horses and a standard array of equipment could
easily handle a 320 acre farm. Farmers were therefore eager to expand their holdings. They
could expand by buying out neighbours, but that could be expensive since they would then
acquire buildings they did not need. Given the distribution of farm lands under Dominion land
policy, most farmers likely had a vacant 160 acres of land contiguous to their homesteads
owned by either the Crown, available at a reduced rate under a policy of preemption, or by a
railway.60 In fact, many farmers had come to rely on vacant land contiguous to their own
property for grazing cattle and horses, and were therefore essentially obliged to purchase the
land in order to retain access to this surplus grazing land when the land speculation boom of the
war began.61
The exact size of this land consolidation cannot be determined since data are available
on the aggregate distribution of farm sizes at Census years only. Average farm size increased
19 per cent from 289 acres in 1911 to 344 acres in 1921. However, because there was an
increase of 37,000 new farms (many of them 160 acre homesteads) between 1911 and 1921, the
overall increase in average farm size will understate the growth of large farms due to
consolidation. A rough estimate can be made as follows. The Census does categorize farms by
size for a few categories. In particular, it categorizes farm sizes below and above 200 acres. In
1911 there were 109,346 farms smaller than 200 acres and 89,857 farms larger than 200 acres.
Since average farm size in 1911 was 289 acres and farms smaller than 200 acres were on
average 150 acres, farms larger than 200 acres must have averaged 458 acres. From 1911 to
1921 average farm size increased to 344 acres and the number of farms 200 acres and larger
increased by 60,726. It is assumed that all of these new large farms had been 160 acre farms in
1911, and that they had all doubled in size to 320 acres as farmers preempted Crown land or
60 Crown lands on the Prairies were distributed in 160 acres quarter sections to homesteaders at no cost provided
improvements were made to the land -- buildings, etc. -- to establish that the homesteader was indeed a farmer.
Recognizing that 160 acres was too small, homesteaders were eligible to acquire another quarter section
adjacent to their property from the Crown at a reduced rate. This was termed "preemption". The railways were
granted large numbers of quarter sections throughout the Prairies to induce rail expansion, so many farmers
were also able to purchase land from the rail company. This gave value to the right of preemption.
61 Voisey Vulcan, p. 131-2.
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purchased land from the railways. The 105,074 farms smaller than 200 acres in 1921 averaged
about 150 acres. The 89,857 farms that had already been larger than 200 acres in 1911,
averaging 458 acres, must therefore have averaged 588 acres in 1921. That is a 29 per cent
increase in the size of the large farms from 1911-1921.
Several adjustments were needed to the Prairie wheat economy to make it viable on a
long-term basis.  Farmers had to increase the size of their farms. They had to learn that there
were districts of the region with a climate too precarious for grain farming. The war accelerated
this adjustment process but it was a process that the region was going to have to pass through
regardless
Western wheat farmers were not the only ones to benefit from wartime demand. The
mixed farmers of eastern Canada also saw large increases in the prices of their products. Beef
and dairy producers did not do so spectacularly as their prices went up only by 30 per cent
between 1913 and 1917, although farmers who made butter for sale saw a 60 per cent rise in
their product. Hog prices went up 44 per cent but took another 20 per cent jump in 1918. Potato
prices doubled and prices of oats and barley (also of importance to eastern farmers) more than
doubled. Certainly the increase in product prices did not pass by eastern farmers.
Export revenues for products of mixed farming output increased dramatically. Most
important were exports of bacon and beef which both increased nine-fold in quantity terms,
though the value of beef exports was always less than half that of bacon exports. While it is
well known that bacon exports rose, that imports of pork from the U.S. increased at a faster rate
has never been highlighted. Imports of pork were trivial in 1913 but were over 30 per cent  of
the value of bacon exports at their peak in 1917. Diverting hog production to supplying
provisions to both troops and the British public did have a direct cost and required imports to
offset the loss of available domestic production. In contrast, the wheat export boom of the
period did not seem to require the same direct diversion of resources.
Previous writers have acknowledged that farmers gained from higher product prices but
have been quick to qualify that by pointing out that their costs also rose. They had to pay more
for hired labor, but hired labor was not a large component of farmers costs in Canada.62
Farmers relied mostly on unpaid family workers. Other purchased inputs were a small element
in Canadian agriculture, and this was a period when farm families produced a lot of the goods
62 We do not have good statistics on the wages of farm labor in this period but the general wage index points to a
rise of 25 per cent between 1913 and 1917. Farmers whose crop prices had doubled could hardly begrudge that.
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for their own consumption. It is hard to escape the conclusion that farmers gained substantially,
and farmers comprised a large fraction of the Canadian population.63
Agriculture was not the only sector of the Canadian economy to have greatly increased
output over the first three years of the war. The manufacturing sector also expanded,
contributing about as much as agriculture to the increase in GDP. Not surprisingly, that
increase was unevenly distributed, as is shown in Table 4. Three sub-sectors of manufacturing
had gains that made the largest impact. These were food and beverage manufacturing, iron and
steel products, and chemicals. The expansion of food manufacturing largely reflects increased
flour milling for export. Before the war Canada had a very small chemical industry.64 Starting
from a minuscule base a large chemical explosive industry was developed. This was an area
where the Imperial Munitions Board (IMB), an agency of the British government set up to
acquire supplies in Canada, played a direct role. It established national factories to produce
munitions and other military supplies. 65 The largest increase in manufacturing came in the iron
and steel industry. This is a large, conglomerate, industry covering everything from primary
iron and steel to machinery of many sorts. Canadian manufactures concentrated heavily on one
class of product  artillery rounds, and especially the steel shells that were the projectiles of
those rounds. They became a leading export of the country, accounting for 25% of total export
earnings at their peak in 1917. The Canadian steel industry turned sharply to making steel
billets and forging them into shells. In the process it more than doubled its steel making
capacity. The largest contributor, Algoma Steel at Sault-Ste-Marie, essentially abandoned its
Bessemer steel rail mill to invest in Open Hearth furnaces to produce steel for shells. Other
primary steel producers increased their capacity. By the end of the war Canada had doubled its
steel making capacity.66 With an investment in the appropriate forging machinery firms with no
previous experience in this type of manufacture got into the business.67
63 We do not have a reliable measure of the farm population of Canada at the time of World War I but in 1911
the agricultural sector engaged 34 per cent of the nations work force. 
64 It produced acids for the pulp and paper industry, some fertilizers, and electro-chemicals  one product of
Canadian inventiveness. Acetylene was the invention of Canadian Thomas Willson who was a main participant
in the development of calcium carbide. Canada had no explosives industry.
65 There were only seven of these government enterprise  national factories, but they were large undertakings.
Four of the seven national factories produced chemicals for explosives. The Gooderham and Worts distillery
in Toronto was converted to a national factory for the production of acetone, a solvent used to make cordite.
A plant to make cordite was set up in northern Ontario. There was a nitrocellulose powder and gun-cotton plant
at Renfrew in the Ottawa valley, and a large explosives plant at Trenton, east of Toronto. A private firm, the
Dominion Steel and Coal Company in Nova Scotia, developed a process to make toluol for T.N.T. out of coal
gas 
66 By 1913 it had already created sufficient steel making capacity to meet its peacetime needs for the next 25
years.
67 The Canada Cement Company, with no background in metal fabricating, was very successful in forging large
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Table 4: Change in GDP in Manufacturing, 1913  1917.
change % change change as %
($millions) of mfg total
All Manufacturing 275 145 100.0
Food and beverages 57 161 20.8
Tobacco 5 110 1.9
Rubber products 7.2 210 2.6
Leather products 9.0 82 3.3
Primary textiles 14.1 220 5.1
Clothing 15.3 104 5.6
Wood products 16.9 72 6.1
Paper 17.2 328 6.2
Printing 8.9 219 3.2
Iron and steel 51.9 164 18.9
Transport equipment 13.8 107 5.0
Non-ferrous metals 15.3 120 5.6
Electrical apparatus 4.9 176 1.8
Non-metallic minerals -1.4 -17 -0.5
Petroleum and coal products 2.6 88 1.0
Chemicals 35.1 448 12.8
Miscellaneous manufacturing 1.7 90 0.6
Other manufacturing sectors that gained from the war were non-ferrous metal smelting
and refining (copper, nickel, zinc) although that remained a relatively small industry.68 The
increased protection afforded by higher tariffs and the rupture of imports from Britain allowed
the Canadian primary textile industries to expand, but again, they were a relatively modest
element in the overall expansion of manufacturing. Paper manufacturing expanded greatly but
that was much less directly connected to the war than to the free access to the U.S. market
Canada gained in 1911 The war may, of course, have accentuated the demand for newspapers
in the U.S., and in Canada for that matter.
The main point is that the wars impact on manufacturing was large, but concentrated
heavily in a few lines of production. Canadian firms did not get contracts for a wide range of
more sophisticated products from which they might have derived longer-lasting benefits. For
example, the nascent Canadian motor vehicle industry got little stimulation. Instead, one of the
larger firms, the Russell Motor Car company turned its efforts to trying, with only modest
caliber steel shells. After the war it would return to making Portland cement. The non-metallic mineral
industries, of which Canada Cement would have been a prominent component, was the only manufacturing
sector to have reduced production. That reflected the big decline in construction
68 One important advanced mentioned by most enthusiast about Canadian industrial development due to the war
was the invention of new processes to refine zinc ores that boosted production in British Columbia and later
were widely adopted around the world. Prior to the war Germany and Belgium had been the principal suppliers
to the world of refined zinc.
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success, to making the fuses for the artillery rounds that were being put together in Canada.
What the British would call the engineering sector of Canadian manufacturing gained little
from the war.
IV.B. The Great Fall: Sources of Income Decline, 1917-1921
Income per capita in Canada had already begun to fall before the war was over. From
its peak in 1917 to the trough in 1921 it declined 24.4 per cent. This was not just a matter of
deflation. While prices fell from 1920 to 1921, the price level in 1921 was still 29 per cent
above 1917. There was not only a decline in GDP but a great restructuring as well. The sectoral
composition of the economy in 1921 was considerably different from what it was in 1917. The
changes are shown in Table 5 which has the same format as preceding ones.
Table 5: The Sectoral Distribution of Decline in GDP, 1917-1921.
change % change change 
($ millions) % of total
Gross Domestic Product - 80 - 2.1 100.0
Price level + 29.0
Agriculture -281 30.1 - 351.2
Forestry 0 0 0
Fishing, hunting & trapping - 2 - 5.3 - 2.1
Mining - 2 - 1.7 - 2.5
Manufacturing - 87 - 9.1 - 108.8
Gas & electric utilities 16 50.8 20.0
Transport 87 33.6 108.8
Communication 12 51.8 15.0
Construction 53 43.8 66.2
Banking and finance 62 47.3 77.5
Federal government - 167 - 63.0 - 209.0
Other government & education 80 69.3 100.0
House rents 111 54.8 138.8
Trade & services 122 20.5 152.5
In current dollar terms GDP fell by 2.1 per cent. While that does not seem to be at all large, and
the price level had declined by 11 per cent in the depression year of 1921, prices in 1921 were
still 29 per cent above the level of 1917, so the drop in real GDP was substantial. Three sectors
dominated the decline: the federal government, agriculture and manufacturing -- the same
sectors that had experienced the big expansion during the war.
It is no surprise that, with the war over, government expenditures on goods and services
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should have declined.69 That is precisely what one would expect. What may be interesting,
though, is that the fall was as great as 63 per cent. The ratchet view of the growth of
government might have led one to expect less of a contraction.70 As noted, however, the total
budgetary expenditures of the federal government did not shrink. The Rowell-Sirois
Commission cites 1921 federal current account expenditures at $354 million, up from just $118
million in 1913. It points out that of the 1921 expenditures, $132 million went to interest on the
public debt and another $54 million to veterans pensions.71 The main point is that the federal
government contribution to GDP went down substantially. At the same time there was a big
expansion in provincial and municipal government, including public education. This was not a
matter of other levels of government taking over activities that had formerly been under the
aegis of the federal government, but rather a making up for things not attended to in wartime.
The automobile age had arrived and both municipal and provincial governments were busily
constructing surfaced streets and highways. There was catching up in education as well.
Public Education had the biggest increase of all sectors in this period. Overall, the increased
contribution to GDP of other levels of government was large enough to offset almost one-half
of the fall in the contribution of the federal government.
The really striking decline came in agricultural production. This was a large sector of
the economy and its decline had a big impact. The fall in agricultural output was two-thirds
greater than that of the federal government. A 30 per cent fall in current dollar agricultural
output at a time when the general level of prices was up by 29 per cent is a major change. The
composition of changes in farm revenues is presented in Table 6 and we see there that, not
surprisingly, the big story again was with wheat. The value of output was down almost 40 per
cent. That was primarily due to a sharp fall in price. Yields were lower in 1921, but total
production of wheat was up. Acreage seeded to wheat, despite sharply falling export demand,
was up 58 per cent over 1917. Average yield of wheat  fell on average from 15.8 to 12.9
69 The federal budget did not fall by as much. There were new transfer payments to be made in the form of
soldier settlement and veterans pensions and a greatly increased burden of interest on the public debt to be met. 
70 Canada at this time appears to provide little support for the arguments of Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan. 
71 There may be a problem with the matter of interest on the public debt. One reason that interest payments were
so high is that the federal government assumed the bond interest obligations of the railways that were eventually
rolled into the CNR. Those were interest payments on real productive assets. While they were privately operated
railways interest on their bonds was included in GDP. In 1917 the federal government assumed the interest
obligations of the Canadian Northern, the Grand Trunk, and the Grand Trunk Pacific. Those became charges on
the public debt. In estimating GDP in the federal government sector Urquhart and McDougall leave out interest
on the grounds that it is simply a transfer payment. When the CNR was formally organized in 1923 there began
a separate accounting for its debt. Over the years between 1917 and 1923, however, there were large interest
payments that were returns on real productive assets. Perhaps they might have been considered as a write-off but
the real assets those bonds had financed were carrying a lot of freight.
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bushels to the acre, so 1921 could not be regarded as a good crop year.
A proportionally even greater decline came in farm revenue from cattle sales, off 63 per
cent. That was mostly a decline in quantity. Export markets for beef and cattle had evaporated.
Other components of agriculture fared rather better. Hog sales declined only 14 per cent and
sales of milk to cheese factories were down 28 per cent. Other dairy products (butter and
fluid milk), catering to the domestic market, was up 40 per cent, and revenues from egg sales
also rose. The end of the war brought another large restructuring within agriculture. Wheat and
small grains were products of western Canada and cattle were also an important western
product, although not exclusively so. The point is that the post-war slide bore much more
heavily on western than on central Canada. Farmers in Ontario and Quebec, having made
substantial gains during the war, were coming off not-too-badly in the post-war adjustment.
The situation was very different in western Canada.
Table 6: Composition of Change in Farm Revenues, 1917 - 1921
change % change change as %
($millions) of Ag sector total
Total farm revenue - 247.5 -23.3 100.0
Wheat - 149.4 -39.6 - 60.4
Small grains - 24.6 -50.1 - 9.9
Potatoes and vegetables - 7.5 - 9.2 - 3.0
Eggs 2.9 5.6 1.2
Cattle - 78.1  - 63.0 - 31.6 
hogs - 10.3 - 14.0 - 4.2
Cheese - 11.0 - 28.1 - 4.4
Other dairy 43.5 39.6 17.6
Horses - 17.5 - 78.2 - 7.1
Wood 1.5 3.1 0.6
While the really big decline came in the agricultural sector, manufacturing was another
part of the economy where the contribution to GDP fell substantially. The proportional decline
(9.1 per cent) was far less than in agriculture, but this was a large sector and the aggregate
value of the decline in manufacturing was as much as one-third of that of agriculture. The
manufacturing sector also displayed large structural changes. The great shrinkage was
concentrated in those industries most involved with the war effort. One might well have
expected retrenchment. The question of interest was what was there to take the place of the
temporarily expanded munitions industries. The industrial categories which suffered the big
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contractions were chemicals, iron and steel products, non-ferrous metal products, and transport
equipment. Elsewhere, there was some growth in manufacturing.
The most apparent, and least important, part of the story concerns transport equipment.
In the late stages of the war, Canadians had contracted to build a number of ships. It was one of
the most prominent contracts let by the IMB. By 1914 Canadas once great wooden
shipbuilding industry had declined to a non-entity. Canadians had never been successful in
launching a steel shipbuilding industry. Nevertheless, in the late stages of the war contracts
were let to build several ships, some steel, some wooden. This was a once-over project that had
no permanence. There is, however, an important sidelight to this story. The management of
DISCO at Sydney, Nova Scotia, Canadas largest steel company, were convinced that
following the war there would be a shortage of shipping and an opportunity to get into the
building of steel-hulled ships. Consequently, they made a large investment in a plant to produce
ship plate. Their intelligence was faulty. After 1918 the world was awash in shipping capacity.
The ship plate project was a disaster for DISCO and pushed the company into bankruptcy. 
All in all a large segment of Canadian manufacturing industry was faced with a need to
scale down. Not all industries contracted, though, and there were several sectors where
considerable gains were made. As shown in Table 6, paper manufacturing increased by 49 per
cent and printing and publishing even more (56 per cent). With the revival of construction the
non-metallic mineral products industry expanded by 42 per cent. Electrical apparatus
manufacturing was a growing but small industry, and the Canadian primary textile industry,
which had gained from wartime shelter from British competition, continued its expansion. The
growing sectors, however, did not provide sufficient offset to prevent manufacturing as a whole
from contracting. Another manufacturing industry that shrank between 1917 and 1921 was the
non-ferrous metal products industry. Refineries had expanded their output in wartime to
produce the copper and zinc required for shell casings and the nickel for armor plate. Canada
substantially increased its exports of those metals during the war. With the military demand
gone, this industry also had to retreat.
While the main goods-producing sectors of the economy declined between 1917 and
1921, the tertiary sector of the economy experienced growth. Construction revived and the
transport sector expanded. Employment in steam railways rose 16.7 per cent and in electric
street and interurban railways 45 per cent. GDP originating in the transport sector was up by
one-third. Banking and finance saw an expansion of output of 47 per cent. The large trade and
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services sector grew as well.
Table 7: Change in GDP in Manufacturing, 1917  1921.
change % change change as %
($millions) of mfg total
All Manufacturing  - 87 - 9.1 100.0
Food and beverages 8 5.7 9.2
Tobacco 0.6 4.1 0.7
Rubber products 0.2 0.9 0.2
Leather products - 2.5 - 6.3 - 2.9
Primary textiles 10.0 27.2 11.5
Clothing 3.1 3.9 3.6
Wood products 1.3 1.5 1.5
Paper 23.4 48.8 26.5
Printing 18.8 56.2 21.6
Iron and steel - 60.1 -32.4 - 69.1
Transport equipment - 15.4 -20.1 - 17.7
Non-ferrous metals - 27.7 -61.2 - 31.8
Electrical apparatus 4.2 26.6 4.8
Non-metallic minerals 7.5 42.0 8.6
Petroleum and coal products 0.4 3.9 0.4
Chemicals - 65.8 - 70.1 - 75.6
Miscellaneous manufacturing 6.6 51.1 7.6
One general point to be addressed concerns the extent to which the reduction in national
income was just a reflection of the well-known business cycle downturn . The U.S. economy
went into depression in 1921 and, to some extent, it could have been expected that the
Canadian economy would follow. In terms of reduced income, the 1921 depression appears to
have been notably more severe in Canada than in the United States. Among the European
countries the depression seems to have been much milder. Two points can be made about the
economic change in Canada. One is that the severe downturn can be seen especially in
industries that are known to have faced a collapse of demand in the immediate post-war period
 explosives, munitions, beef and wheat. Secondly, in the two previous recessions in 1908 and
1914 construction, transport, and banking and finance followed the economy downward.
Between 1917 and 1921 they expanded (although they showed a drop in the depression year of
1921 itself). The depression of 1921 accentuated the sag in the Canadian economy but the
larger problem was the difficulty the economy faced recovering from the diversions brought
about by war. Furthermore, the economy as a whole still had a large farm sector and was
feeling the burden of several years of very poor wheat crops in western Canada.
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IV.C. The Long, Slow Recovery: Expansion, 1921 - 1925
From the low of 1921 the Canadian economy grew, finally getting back up to its pre-
war level of real per capita income only in 1925. Consider the composition of change, sector by
sector, in the economy to see the strong points and the weak points. The data again are
measured in current dollars. Over the period under consideration the price level was sliding
downward and dropped by 10 per cent.
The sectoral composition of change in GDP is shown in Table 8. There was an increase
in nominal GDP of 23.5 per cent from the low point in 1921 to 1925 when Canadian real per
capita income finally got up to about where it had been twelve years before. The two biggest
areas of expansion were in agriculture and in trade and services.72 
Table 8: Recovery and Expansion, 1921 - 1925
change % change change as 
($millions) % of total GDP
Gross Domestic Product 883 23.5 100.0
Implicit Price Deflator - 10.0
Agriculture 317 48.5 35.9
Forestry 28 75.1 3.2
Fishing, hunting & trapping 6 19.9 0.7
Mining 17 15.1 1.9
Manufacturing 81 9.3 9.2
Gas & electric utilities 21 44.8 2.4
Transport 21 6.0 2.4
Communication 6 16.6 0.7
Construction 23 13.0 2.6
Banking and finance - 10 - 5.2 - 1.1
Federal government  - 7 - 7.0 -0.8
Other government 19 9.5 2.2
House rents 43 13.7 4.9
Trade and services +316 50.5 35.8
In this period the recovery of agriculture was the main force propelling the Canadian
economy. The composition of change in agriculture is presented in Table 9. Western farmers
finally got a good wheat crop that they could sell at a reasonably high price. Income from cattle
and hogs was up by almost as much. Even cheese production increased by one-third over what
it had been in 1921. The only puzzle is dairying other than cheese. Farm income from butter
and fluid milk was actually down a bit. Those products were sold on the domestic market.
72 Given the somewhat dicey nature of the estimation of GDP in trade and services we should not make too
much of the expansion there. It might be simply a reflection of measurement error.
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Their production had increased relatively quickly after the war. By 1925 they were probably
just keeping pace with the domestic economy and may have faced downward sliding prices.
The years immediately before and after 1925 showed higher farm revenues from other
dairying. On the whole the agricultural situation was favorable in both western and central
Canada. Western wheat farmers, who had taken the opportunity to enlarge their farms were
now seeing their decisions justified. 
Table 9: Elements of Change, Agricultural Revenues, 1921 - 1925
change % change change as
($millions) % of total
Gross Domestic Product 
in Agriculture 317 48.5
Total farm revenues 325 40.0
Wheat 186 81.9 57.2
Small grains 19 77.3 5.8
Potatoes and vegetables 44 59.0 13.5
Eggs - 5 - 8.7 - 1.5
Cattle 29 63.9 8.9
Hogs 46 73.6 14.2
Cheese 9 33.2 2.8
Other dairy - 3 - 2.3 - 0.9
Forestry production was also up substantially, most likely reflecting the strong growth of the
pulp and paper industry, but that was still a small sector with only a modest national impact.73
Over much of the rest of the economy there was a notable lack of real vigor to the expansion.
Nominal GDP in manufacturing was by 1925 only nine per cent higher than in 1921, and over
that same period the price level dropped by a bit more than that. Other large sectors 
construction and transport  showed only modest growth, and GDP in Banking and finance
was down by five per cent.  This last may well be a reflection of the difficult times experienced
by Canadas banking sector. The years between 1919 and 1925 saw bank failures and near
failures. The number of chartered banks was reduced by half as the weaker absorbed by the
larger ones.
IV.C.1. A Post War Banking Crisis?
Did World War I induce a banking crisis in Canada? What happened in Canadian
banking had all the earmarks of a crisis. Only one bank, the Home Bank, actually failed. A
73 In the Canadian industrial statistics the forest sector includes only pulpwood cut for sale to pulp factories. The
forest operations of the pulp and paper firms themselves are included in the manufacturing sector.
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large part of the sector was, however, in deep trouble. Several large banks were teetering on the
brink of failure. The time-honored process in the Canadian system of extensive branch banking
has been for the strong banks in the system to absorb banks that were about to fail. In that way
the whole system would not be jeopardized by traumatic failures. The fact that only one bank
actually was allowed to fail might be thought of as an aberration.74 Serious difficulties began in
1921, but the really critical years were 1923 and 1924.
The question of interest is whether this banking crisis can be said to be a direct result of
World War I financing or whether it was only indirectly connected. If the aftermath of the war
weakened the economy, that would have undermined the soundness of many of the banks.
Earlier periods of economic distress had not generated such severe banking difficulties. A good
case could be made that war conditions were indeed the source of erosion in the Canadian
banking system. Previous writers have passed off the problem as one of the banks having
trouble contending with deflation. However, the Consumer Price Index declined by only 10 per
cent. That hardly looks like a huge challenge. We look for alternative explanations. Under the
elastic credit conditions during the war it was certainly easier for the banks liberally to extend
loans. Indeed, they were explicitly encouraged to do so by the government which was always
under stress to increase production of war-related goods. Also they found it attractive to lend to
farmers who, facing big increases in the prices of their products, thought it sensible to expand.
This led to a lot of ill-considered loans. And then in 1921 the inflation broke and prices fell. In
the meantime the banks had been in the classic position of creditors in an inflation  lending
out money that was later repaid in lower valued dollars. That in itself would have put the
banking system under strain. With the ease of increasing their reserves during the war years the
banks were probably more liberal with their loans than they might otherwise have been,
especially when it was patriotic to make loans to firms thought to be contributing to the war
effort.
While the careful studies do not seem to have been done it appears to be most likely
that the banks came out of the war with more dubious loan portfolios than earlier caution might
have sustained. Debtor firms and farms then faced sharp depression followed by a weak,
halting recovery of the economy. Almost one-third of Canadas banking firms found
74 The failure of the Home Bank engendered a national Royal Commission which found that it was not just a
lack of due diligence but outright malfeasance. The Home was a much smaller bank than the Merchants, the
Bank of Hamilton, the Standard, and the Union. Those banks, heavily burdened with bad loans, were absorbed
before the actually went bankrupt.
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themselves in unsustainable circumstances. It is hard to believe that, in the absence of war,
these problems would have clustered so severely in the immediate post-war years.75 Among
the other legacies of war, then,  was this crisis in the banking system. The fact of the crisis has
been recognized by many but there has been a tendency among historical writers to look upon
the handling of this crisis, with only one actual failure of a bank, as a triumph of the stable
nature of the Canadian banking system. Too little attention has been paid to why there should
have been a crisis in the first place. More research is certainly needed to establish the extent to
which the banking crisis of the early 1920s was a direct result of the dislocations of the war
experience as opposed to simply the problems of a generally weakened economy.
IV.C.2. The Railways  Still Another War-Related Problem in the Economy
By the end of the war the Canadian economy was beset with the problem of another
troubled sector  transport  which had long lingering consequences. The federal
government had nationalized a large segment of the railway industry. In the years before the
war, with the Prairie wheat economy rapidly building, there was an ambitious program of
railway construction. There was a need for branch railway lines in the Prairie Provinces but in
addition to that two new transcontinental lines were initiated  to compete with the existing
Canadian Pacific. The Canadian Northern crossed the Prairies well to the north of the CPR and
pushed on through the mountains to the west coast. Not to be left out, the by then venerable
Grand Trunk Railway of Canada built a line just to the south of the Canadian Northern, then
followed a new route to a Pacific terminal at Prince Rupert. This third line was established as a
subsidiary under the name of the Grand Trunk Pacific. Ebullient politicians, thinking about all
the pork from the railway construction barrel that could be doled out in eastern Canada,
launched a new route from the Lakehead to the Maritimes through thousands of miles of
uninhabited rock and bush in northern Ontario and Quebec.76 This was a massive, over-
ambitious program of railway building that was not quite completed when war broke out.
These new lines were immediately in financial trouble. They depended heavily upon
selling their bonds in the London market, and that was closed to them. The Northern had been
75 There was a pronounced upsurge in commercial bankruptcies in 1922 and 1923. 
76 This National Transcontinental line was to be operated under lease by the Grand Trunk Pacific. There are
conflicting views as to the principal motivation for its construction, some thinking that it was a sop to Quebec
voters, others that it was a scheme to direct more export trade to ports in the Maritimes. Whatever, it was a
massive waste of capital. The federal government already operated one heavily subsidized line to the Maritimes,
the Intercolonial.
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financed almost entirely through fixed interest securities, its promoters having themselves put
in virtually no equity capital. It was in a serious bind. In itself it was not an implausible venture
but facing competition from the nearby Grand Trunk Pacific, and with a shaky financial
structure, it was doomed. The GTP, also under great financial strain, declined to take up
operation of the National Transcontinental. The railways problems were exacerbated by the
fact that during the war freight rates were essentially frozen by the government while costs,
especially coal and wages, rose substantially. The Government of Canada had a mess on its
hands. It felt that it could not simply let these new railway companies go bankrupt while a war
was being fought. It assumed the debt obligations of the railways and took over the Canadian
Northern, the Grand Trunk and the Grand Trunk Pacific. The Canadian Pacific survived as a
private company. After the war the government rolled all the non-economic railways into a
mess that it called the Canadian National Railway. That in turn had to be heavily subsidized for
many years to come. 
Over the years of the war and immediate aftermath the debt of the Dominion
government rose by 2.3 billion dollars, or by about 50% of 1920 GDP. The assumption of the
debt liabilities of the nationalized railways accounted for 30 per cent of that.77 Beyond that it
was faced with operating an overextended, uneconomic railway system. Dealing with the
railway problem would be a burden for many years. Can that be attributed to World War I?
Most historians of Canada have been highly critical of the excesses of railway building in the
years before 1914 and would argue that even without the war there would have been a railway
problem. Not all of those railways could have been financially successful. Nevertheless, in
peacetime the collapse would not necessarily have come all at once. Railway companies might
have slid into bankruptcy. Their useful assets would have been picked up by other firms and the
unprofitable sections of line abandoned. In other words, without the war Canada might have
dug itself out of the railway mess in a more gradual and more rational manner.78
IV.C.3. Manufacturing Readjustment
77  Rowell-Sirois Royal Commission, Report, p. 103. The current account expenditures of the government rose
by $236 million between 1913 and 1921. Of that increase, $132 million was the added charges of debt service.
78 Without inflated costs while freight rates were held fixed the problems of the rail firms might not have been so
urgent. With continued access to bond markets the Northern might have continued. It came very close to getting
needed financing in the United States. As a functioning concern it might have been able to sell equity shares and
so to pay down some of its bond debt. Without so many other problems beleaguering it the government might
have been prepared eventually to write off the National Transcontinental as a bad mistake. The war was not the
only problem besetting the railways but it certainly compounded them.
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To a large extent, however, the weak and slow recovery of the Canadian economy can
be attributed to the poor performance of the manufacturing sector. Prior to WWI Canada was
industrializing vigorously. Indeed, by 1913 it was near the top of the world in per capita GDP
from manufacturing. Canadian industry had shown remarkable ability to adapt to wartime
needs and to expand production accordingly. In the aftermath of the war it was unable to show
the same agility. It had a lot of non-useful capacity, and lacked investment to handle many of
the new products of the age. Those new products were technically sophisticated and often most
efficiently produced at very large scale. Under those conditions it had become difficult for
Canadian firms to compete with the large firms in the U.S. The pattern of change in Canadas
manufacturing sector in the recovery period 1921-1925 is shown in Table 10.
Table 10: Change in Manufacturing, 1921 - 1925
change % change change as % of
($ millions) total manufacturing
Manufacturing total 81 9.3 100.0
Food and beverages 4 2.4 4.9
Tobacco - 7 - 41.3 - 8.6
Rubber 14 79.1 17.3
Leather - 1 - 2.8 - 1.2
Primary textiles - 6 - 12.1 - 7.4
Clothing 2 + 1.9 2.5
Wood products 0 0 0
Paper 23 32.4 28.4
Printing 2 4.6 2.5
Iron and steel - 1 - .1  - 1.2
Transport equipment 18  29.9  22.2
Non-ferrous metals 16 90.1 19.8
Electrical apparatus 8 41.5 9.9
Non-metallic mineral 3 10.7 3.7
Petroleum and coal - 3 - 23.9 - 3.7
Chemicals 10 37.2 12.3
Miscellaneous - 2 - 11.4 - 2.5
There were some bright spots in Canadian industry, notably motor vehicles, pulp and
paper, and non-ferrous metal refining, but there were just not enough of them. A rise of only
nine per cent in GDP originating in manufacturing, adding just $81 million to a GDP of $3,739
million is pretty pallid. With an abundance of forests and open access to the U.S. market, the
pulp and paper industry continued its vigorous expansion. The motor vehicle industry was not
the only contributor to the substantial growth of the transport equipment industry but it was
34
certainly one of the success stories of the period.79 Non-ferrous metal smelting was one of the
few industries benefited by the war. Technical advances in refining processes induced by the
emergency allowed the exploitation of some of Canadas complex ores. That was not the whole
story, however. This industry was boosted by aluminum smelting based on Canadas cheap and
abundant hydro-electric power. The chemical industry also contributed to the expansion of
manufacturing and it might be encouraging to think of that as a carry over from the war but it
was not the case. Production of explosive chemicals in Canada was abandoned and the
industrys growth reflected mainly the production of materials (acids and alkalis) for the pulp
and paper industry. The notable disappointments in this period were that the food
manufacturing industry (flour milling, pork packing, and cheese making) was unable to sustain
its position as an export industry; the primary textile industry which had expanded under the
highly protective conditions of war was faced with retreat; and the large iron and steel industry,
mainly primary steel, stagnated.80
V. Was it Capital Undernourishment?
A strong case can be made that through the war and for several years afterward the
Canadian economy was beset by insufficient capital investment. This had several dimensions.
The inflow of foreign capital, which just prior to the war had been huge, dropped essentially to
zero. The domestic savings ratio sagged as well. Much of the new investment that was made
during the war related directly to the war effort and had little carry-over into productive peace
time uses. The capital that the country had accumulated was depreciating and was not
maintained. Then there occurred one of the strongest cases of crowding out ever to be found. 
The ratio of fixed capital investment to GNP for the years 1906 to 1926 is depicted in
79 Railway locomotives and rolling stock also had to be replaced and that also added to the growth of this sub-
sector. The Canadian automobile industry grew substantially in the early 1920s and is the real success story of
the period, carrying along with it the rubber industry to make its tires. In the 1920s Canada had the second
largest, only to the United States, automobile manufacturing industry in the world. It exported about one-third of
its output. Nevertheless, Canada still imported a lot of automobiles in spite of a relatively high tariff. One might
speculate on whether it could have done better had their been no war. The Canadian industry was not called
upon to produce vehicles for overseas military use. One of the most prominent Canadian manufacturers, the
Russell Motor Car company turned aside from making cars to producing fuses for artillery rounds. Other auto
makers in the country were starved for capital to get established on a firm basis and to expand. 
80 By 1913 Canada had developed a large primary steel industry. To produce war materials it almost doubled its
production capacity during the war. That could not be sustained. It had vast over capacity. Throughout the entire
decade of the 1920s the Canadian steel industry struggled. It faced two problems. It depended heavily on the
U.S. for supplies of iron ore, and it lacked the capital to diversify into the product lines that might sustain it
(McDowell, pp. 70-71). 
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Figure 5.81 Also shown is the implied ratio to GNP of investment out of domestic savings after
foreign capital inflow has been accounted for. The most dramatic feature of Figure 5 is the
plunge in the capital formation ratio. There is little expectation that in the absence of war the
ratio would have remained at the remarkably high levels of 1910 to 1914 but it is highly
doubtful that foreign capital inflow would have halted altogether. Instead, there was an outflow
of capital from Canada in the late years of the war, and the outflow resumed after 1922. Fixed
investment out of domestic savings, which had fluctuated around about 0.164 in the years
before the war, declined also, although nowhere near so dramatically. By 1918 it had fallen as
low as 0.135. The Canadian economy, which had been growing vigorously with high rates of
investment was, after 1914, greatly constrained in additions made to its capital stock.
The investment statistics are gross capital formation and cover allowances for
depreciation as well as additions to the capital stock. Given that some amount of investment
had to be made to tool up for munitions production, one might wonder whether enough was left
in the rest of the economy to make adequate provision for replacement of depreciated capital. It
might not be so surprising that investment would have fallen during the war. There were, after
all, other demands on resources. More concerning is that investment did not rise again after the
war. The investment ratio was still so low in 1922 as to leave one wondering whether there was
much left after taking care of depreciation to make any additions to the stock of capital.
Investment in the manufacturing sector, despite the acquisition of the new equipment needed to
forge shells and to produce other elements of artillery rounds, fell in 1915 to just 54.5 per cent
of the 1913 level and it never, even in nominal terms, got back up to that pre-war level before
1926. In 1922 capital added in manufacturing was still only 58.4 per cent of 1913 despite the
fact that inflation had lifted the price level 50 per cent above 1913. During the war investment
shifted markedly away from railway and housing construction, a not entirely surprising change,
but it did not benefit manufacturing. What was notably lacking was enough investment in
machinery and equipment. It has already been noted that with the outbreak of war imports to
Canada fell sharply. The most pronounced fall came in machinery of all sorts. Canada had
always relied heavily upon the United States for the many specialized types of machines and
machine tools. That was the category of imports that showed the greatest decline when overall
imports fell so sharply. 
81 The data are from Urquhart, Gross National Product, Table 1.8
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To get a rough approximation to the magnitude of the likely underinvestment the
following simulation might be considered. Suppose that foreign capital continued to flow into
Canada at just one half of the average of the prosperous years of 1908 to 1913. That would be a
flow of $235 million per year. That level of capital inflow should hardly be excessively
optimistic. A prosperous, industrializing Canada with a continuously rising level of income
would offer plenty of investment opportunities. Suppose also that domestic saving continued
steadily at its 1908 to 1913 rate (.164). On those assumptions, if the economy continued to
grow at the average annual rate experienced over the entire period 1870 to 1926, annual
investment would be the hypothetical numbers shown in Table 11.82 There they are compared
with the actual figures for fixed capital formation as estimated by Urquhart.83 By the last year
of the war actual investment expenditure was just slightly over one-half the hypothetical
estimation. In the years after the war it barely got back to 60 per cent. Cumulated over the years
from 1914 to 1925 the shortfall was $3269 million, and amount equivalent to 57 per cent of the
actual cumulated investment. 
Table 11: Simulated Capital Formation, 1914 - 1925
Year Actual Hypothetical Hypothetical I/HGNP
investment investment GNP
($millions) ($millions) ($millions)
1914 667.5 665.5 2669 .272
1915 475.0 673.0 2742 .245
1916 451.3 684.7 2838 .241
1917 451.8 700.4 2937 .238
1918 371.2 716.7 3040 .236
1919 405.2 733.6 3146 .233
1920 441.7 750.9 3256 .231
1921 431.4 769.0 3370 .228
1922 437.6 787.7 3488 .226
1923 555.8 807.0 3610 .224
1924 500.9 827.0 3736 .221
1925 504.7 847.7 3867 .219
Some who are deeply committed to the simple neo-classical analysis of growth first
popularized by Solow might be inclined to point out that, at least for the United States, capital
accumulation was a lot less important than technological progress. It is not known whether that
82 For convenience 1914 is treated as two half years, one half with actual performance, the other with
hypothetical.
83 To put actual investment in real 1913 terms the ratios of capital formation to GNP reported by Urquhart are
applied to GNP converted to real 1913 dollars. No separate deflator is available for capital goods.
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judgement applies equally to Canada in this period.84 Even Solow would concede that some
part of new technology enters the production system embedded in new capital. To the extent
that we are persuaded by DeLong and Summers that it is machinery investment that drives
economic growth, the circumstances of Canada in this period were even more worrisome.85
Canada was not much adding to, let alone maintaining its stock of machinery. 
As has already been explained, Canadian manufacturing industry during the war
responded to war needs by producing munitions. That required investment in the necessary
equipment.86 Much of that equipment, however, would not be useful in peacetime. The
Canadian steel industry ended the war with far more forging capacity that it would be able to
use, but was drastically short of rolling capacity. In the early 1920s the country had to rely
upon imported rolled structural steel despite the fact that it had a steel industry with vast
overcapacity to produce the primary material. Steel was not alone. Firms in the motor car and
electrical appliance industries diverted their attention to munitions production and came out of
the war with depleted capacity to produce peacetime products.87 The capital used by the
chemical industry to produce cordite and TNT was not useful in the production of acids and
alkalis for the paper industry. So, not only was capital investment at much lower rates than had
prevailed before the war, such capital formation as there was had no peacetime use. What the
economy needed after the war was a surge of investment to retool and re-equip Canadian
industry.88 Under the stringent conditions of the time that did not happen. Canadian industry
84 Even with reasonably good GNP figures, the lack of capital stock statistics and not even very good labor force
statistics for years before 1926 have precluded the estimation of a Solow type model for Canada in that period.
There are other analysts who would give much more prominence to capital accumulation.
85 See the argument presented by Bradford DeLong, Productivity Growth and Machinery Investment, and
DeLong and Summers, Equipment Investment and Economic Growth.
86 The struggle to do that is ably described by Carnegie, The History of Munitions Supply. Only one steel firm in
the country had a machine suitable for the forging of artillery shells. The gauges needed to produce the various
items of munitions all had to be acquired. Some of the national factories had to build extensive new plants,
and in the process there were losses. The huge explosives plant at Trenton, Ontario blew up. Almost all of the
specialized machinery and equipment had to be imported from the United States.
87 One of the most successful national factories was Canadian Aeroplanes. It was put together in short order
but had a fine record of producing 2900 JN-4 aircraft. It gave a fine demonstration that Canadian industry was
able to produce technically sophisticated equipment. There were high hopes that this firm would give Canada a
good start at a commercial airframe manufacturing industry. North America lagged Europe, however, in the
development of commercial aviation and for barnstormers there was an abundance of surplus WWI craft.
Canadian Aeroplanes was scrapped and the factory sold for a song to The Columbia Grammophone
Corporation. sic transit gloria borealis. 
88 This was recognized by Joseph Flavelle, the Canadian chairman of the Imperial Munitions Board, who spoke
out on the issue. He evidently made an eager effort to alert Canadian businessmen and politicians to the
problem. Flavelle was also concerned that the governments imposition of an excess profits tax was going too
far in taxing what might ben the source of re-investment. Flavelles comments are noted by Michael Bliss, A
Canadian Millionaire. Flavelles views were passed off by many as just the special pleading of one of the
nations leading capitalists. 
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went into the post-war recovery period with a depleted capital stock and rates of investment too
low to make up the shortfall. That is where the issue of crowding out intrudes.
With no more abundant capital inflow there was intense competition for the limited
amount of Canadian domestic savings. That is where the idea of crowding out becomes
important. The notion that government borrowing, especially in wartime, crowds out
productive private investment has been raised in other contexts.89 The importance of that in
some prominent historical instances has been questioned.90 If ever there were a convincing case
of crowding out, Canada during and right after World War I is it. It has already been pointed
out that the addition to government expenditure required by the war was financed almost
entirely by borrowing. Almost all of the additional borrowing was done in the domestic market.
The historical accounts hail this as a great achievement, and from one point of view it was. It
had long-lasting effects of creating an on going market for government bonds in Canada where
previously there had not been one. What that meant, however, was that a government which
previously had no presence in the domestic capital market in a very short period of time came
to dominate it. The government persuaded a large number of Canadians to become contented
purchasers of bonds with 5.5 per cent interest. After the war was over it continued to be
difficult to attract those investors to other types of securities. A substantial part of the
government war loans had 1922 redemption dates and had to be re-financed at that time.
Several years after the war was over the government of Canada was still intruding heavily into
the domestic capital market. The large crowding out effect was as much a consequence of the
duration as of the magnitude of novel government borrowing. 
Previous writers have for the most part overlooked the shortfall of investment as one of
the leading costs of the war, although a few have recognized it. J.J. Deutsch is quite explicit in
pointing out that Canadas increased industrial production during the war came at the expense
of reduced capital goods but, in not carrying his analysis beyond 1920, he did not see it as a
continuing problem.91 Moreover, Deutsch gave no indication of the magnitude of the problem.
More recently Tom Naylor has picked up the point but, despite the promising title of his article,
89 Jeffrey Williamson, Why Was British Growth So Slow.
90 See, for example, Carol Heim and Philip Mirowski, Interest Rates and Crowding Out During Britains
Industrial Revolution, and Gregory Clark, Debt, Deficits, and Crowding Out, England 1727-1840.  
91 Deutsch, War Finance . . .
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thinks of the problem largely in terms of uncovered depreciation.92 We would like to emphasize
that a leading cost of the war was its leaving the Canadian economy starved for new
investment and that the situation was made worse by the change in the capital market that came
about because of the war.
The problem was not just one of a shortfall in investment in physical capital. There was
a serious indentation in investment in human capital as well. Loss of human capital is a point
made about the history of World War I in many European countries. What the writers are
usually referring to is the loss of manpower, and especially skilled manpower, because of the
high rate of casualties in the war. There is often talk of a lost generation. Without in anyway
disparaging the Canadian casualties of the war, we would argue that they were not the most
significant element in the loss of human capital. True, 61,000 deaths of men in uniform, and the
disabling of many others was far from trivial. The more educated tended to be field officers
whose casualty rates were higher than those in lower ranks. Still, the really big loss of human
capital came for other reasons. One is that the nation scrimped on resources to the education
sector during the war. In Table 1 it was shown that education, combined with lower levels of
government, had a low increase in  the nominal value of GDP originating over a period (1913-
1917) when the price level rose substantially. Under the pressure of financing the war,
education was one of things that was made to give way. In the large province of Ontario, for
which we have an abundance of reported data, per pupil expenditures on schooling, in nominal
dollars, fell 12 per cent between 1914 and 1917. The war caused the country to go for several
years under-investing in education generally. Probably more important, though, was the loss of
further education by young males.
Young men reaching enlistment age before completing secondary school were strongly
inclined to drop out to join the military. This was noted by the superintendents of education.
From the senior superintendent of schools of Ontario: One of the most inspiring things I found
during the year 1915 was that so many students of the age of 18 or more were enlisting, and
from a district superintendent of high schools: A very considerable number of the senior
pupils have enlisted for overseas service. Those who did not enlist were prone to drop out to
help out on the family farm or the family business, often to take the place of older brothers who
92 R.T. Naylor, in The Canadian State and the Accumulation of Capital . , (p. 48)  writes One of the major
hidden costs of the war was the problem of capital consumption in peacetime industries, coupled with the over
expansion of wartime ones. Naylor too takes no steps to try to put quantitative dimensions on the matter.
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had gone to war. Others were attracted away from school and into the factories. We do not have
the sort of national statistics that would more clearly confirm this development but it is evident
that it was going on. There was widespread interruption of secondary schooling before it was
completed. Most of these young men never made up for their incomplete education.
Continuation into post-secondary education was curtailed as well. Enlistments among
college students ran high, as also among their professors. We do not have national enrolment
statistics for the World War I period but first degrees granted in 1918 were down 25.4 per cent
from 1914.93 Quantitatively, however, this had less impact than the much larger fall in high
school completions. From anecdotal evidence it appears that returning servicemen who had
started college were more likely to go on to complete their university education than were
students who left high school early. There was nothing comparable to a GI bill in post-World
War I Canada. There was much discussion and some actual effort made to provide increased
vocational schooling for returning veterans, but no programs of direct support. 94
Canada came out of the war with a substantial shortfall of human capital. Recent
writing on economic growth and development has placed an especially strong emphasis on the
role of human capital. A big reduction over several years in investment in human capital can
only have been a further impediment to vigorous recovery and growth in an economy that was
generally undernourished by investment. If one could put comparable dimensions to the under-
investment in human capital it would add significantly to the shortfall in investment in physical
capital argued for in the preceding section. All in all, the weakness of addition to the capital
stock, both physical and human, was probably the most serious cost of the war to Canada and a
major contributor to the slowness of recovery in the post-war years.
VI. The Issue of the Distribution of Income and Wealth
Before offering a summing up we would like to reflect upon the distributional issue that
has previously attracted so much attention in historical writing on the effects of the war in
Canada. The existing literature sees large elements of the common people as losers from the
war. Farmers are described as facing regulated prices and increased costs, as unwisely taking
on more debt, and as being induced to seek short-run gains by resorting to shoddy farm
93 Harris, A History of Higher Education in Canada.
94 Instead, Canadian veterans were favored by the time-honored procedure of granting them farm land, often in
some of the most unproductive locations. Some British soldiers were similarly rewarded with small
farmsteads in Canada.
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practices. Certainly the years following the war saw plenty of plenty of political unrest in the
rural areas. Factory workers are also depicted as facing increases in the cost of living that
eroded such wage increases that they were able to obtain. The capitalists, the industrialists, the
financiers are claimed to have profited from the war as they always do. Profiteering from war is
a standard expectation. The very success of the Government of Canada in creating a domestic
market for its bonds merely enhanced a rentier class which lived off the interest payments
required by the greatly enlarged public debt.
We would argue that this picture of the distributional consequences of the war is largely
misconceived. To begin with the industrial workers, they did not face reduced real wages. The
cost of living did indeed go up. Like most other governments, the Canadian financed the war in
an inflationary manner. By 1918 the Cost of Living Index stood 49 per cent above where it had
been in 1913. The general wage index rose by just about the same amount. In real terms the
workers stood where they were in 1913. They had not gained but neither had they lost. Perhaps
there was some expectation that they should have gained, but over the whole economy real per
capita income in 1918 was just where it was in 1913. The underlying point of our paper is that
there was no growth in the economy, so why should wage earners be expected to have anything
other than stable wages? In fact, for many their earnings were enhanced. Wage rates may have
been stable but employment was stronger and there was quite a lot of overtime to be earned.
There was, however, some re-distribution within the wage-earning element of the economy.
Two things influenced that. One is that workers in public enterprises and in the construction
trades were held to low wage increases. The gainers were factory workers, but not all of them.
Skilled workers were paid on hourly rates while unskilled production line operatives got piece
rates. In the munitions factories the learning curve was steep and the operatives saw their
earnings increase more rapidly than those of the skilled workers who got paid on a time basis.
That led to considerable labor unrest. It was the skilled workers who at the time were more
organized into craft unions. By the late years of the war there was growing labor unrest and an
increasing number of strikes. Union membership and union pressure increased substantially at
that time. Capitalists who take advantage of wartime demands to increase their earnings are
profiteers, but workers who similarly take advantage of the pressures of the war economy to
make similar demands are evidently not to be thought of in the same way. 
Figure 6 shows the index of wages deflated by changes in the cost of living along with
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an index of real per capita income. Wage workers gained in the early years of the war.95 As
prices rose in 1916 and 1917 real wages slipped. By 1918 the real wage index was back to
where it had been in 1913. Following the war, however, real wages rose substantially. In 1921,
a year of depression when real per capita income had fallen to just 75 per cent of the 1913
level, real wages were up 22 per cent over the pre-war level. By 1925 wages were 30 per cent
above where they had been in 1913. Wage earners did not gain during the war but neither did
they lose. In the years after the war, however, they made substantial gains while the rest of the
economy remained stagnant. 
The farmers primarily received a large windfall during the war. The prices of their
products increased greatly. That was especially so of western wheat farmers. The government
indeed stepped in to administratively fix the price of wheat, but at two and a half times the
price it had been in 1913. The price of wheat, sagging only a little, remained at an unusually
high level for four years. That was a great benefit to farmers. Some of them took their capital
gains by selling their land and getting out of agriculture. Others bought more land and enlarged
their farms, just what one would expect farmers facing increased prices to do. To do that, and
to add to their capital by acquiring more machinery and motor vehicles, they added to their
debt.96  It was hardly irrational for them to do so. As it turned out they were faced with paying
back those debts in greatly devalued dollars. Inflation is supposed to favor debtors to the
disadvantage of lenders. What happened to Canadian farmers in World War I looks to be what
populists had long dreamed of and pressed for.
Costs to farmers of purchased inputs also went up, as the historians have been quick to
emphasize. What has not been adequately recognized, however, is that purchased inputs were a
small part of farmers costs. Overall, Canadian farmers at this time hired relatively little labor.
They relied mainly on unremunerated family members. Their other purchased inputs were a
small part of their operation. Not only did they grow most of the feed for their animals, they
produced a lot of the food consumed by their households. To a large extent they were insulated
against the inflation of prices. It is hard to escape the conclusion that Canadas farmers were
substantial gainers from the circumstances of war.
The farmers gains, however, were not sustained after the war. The prices they got for
95 This was also a time when large numbers of unemployed were getting absorbed back into paid work.
96 We might note that they did not at this time investment in tractors. That development in Canadian agriculture
came later.
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Cattle 1.02 1.34 0.76
Hogs 1.60 1.72 0.93
Butte 1.43 1.77 0.81
Fluid milk 1.40 1.80 0.78
Eastern barley 1.21 1.89 0.64
Western wheat 1.84 2.96 0.62
Farmers in eastern (that is really to say central) Canada were, in relative terms, back about to
where they were before the war. The general level of prices had gone up about 50 per cent.
Western wheat farmers appear to have fared rather better but we should point out that the price
of wheat had dropped sharply for three years in the early 1920s and had only begun to recover
in 1924 and 1925. The war had promoted the large exports of wheat that had been the ambition
of western farmers in their furious settlement of the Canadian plains in the years just before the
war. Nature, however, had dealt them a cruel blow. From 1918 through 1921 they had four
consecutive years of very poor crops, and a severely short crop again in 1924. They were
learning that the Canadian plains were not so conducive to the production of wheat as they had
thought. The volatility of world markets played against them as well. When they were able to
get decent yields in 1922 and 1923 the world price of wheat had dropped severely. Looking
back on their experience of the preceding decade or so, western Canadian wheat farmers could
say that they had been through hard times. That was not because of the war, however, but
because natural conditions had battered them severely.97
What of the supposed gainers from the war, the profiteers? Many accusations were
levied and there was a lot of agitation about profiteering. This led to government investigations.
Undoubtedly a few blatant cases could be found. Overall, however, there is little evidence to
97  Had farmers in 1921 got even the average yields they achieved the following year their revenues would have
been a bit more than 25 per cent greater. The price fall of 50 per cent that year played a larger role in loss of
farm income from wheat. Given the large role Canadian wheat exports had come to play on the world market it
is possible that a larger Canadian crop would have depressed the world price of wheat even more. The wheat
farmers problem was also one of adjusting to the post-war conditions in the world wheat market. That was
largely accomplished by 1924. Better crops would have made the transition a lot less painful.
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support widespread profiteering. One cannot readily identify prominent business firms that
gained unusually from the war. Initial contracts for novel work on munitions were indeed
generous. That was partly because it was presumed that, with a short war, the contractors
capital expenditures would have to be paid off quickly. As the war continued subsequent
contracts were commonly negotiated at reduced prices that recognized learning from
experience and lower costs of production. The large steel firms came out of the war in weak
financial condition.98 Without more careful research than has been done to date about all that
can be said of industrial profits is that the war offered a mixed experience. The post-war
readjustment was a lot more painful.99
VI. Conclusions
World War I delivered a major, long-lasting shock to the Canadian economy. It cost
Canadians twelve years of normal economic growth. Under continuing peacetime growth at the
long-run average rate experienced by the Canadian economy real per capita income might have
been one-third higher in 1925 than it was. The effects of the war can be traced differently in the
two main sectors of the Canadian economy  agriculture and industry.
In 1913 Canada was still an importantly agricultural economy, with 20 per cent of its
GDP derived directly from farming, and an even larger fraction of its labor force dependent
upon it.100 The war itself benefited farmers, especially western wheat farmers. They got a very
large windfall in the form of much higher prices for their products. The higher price of wheat
accelerated and brought more quickly to a culmination a settlement process that had been
vigorously underway before the war. The establishment of western Canada as a major region of
wheat production was a process launched well before the war. It was going to be pushed
through to completion, war or no war. Those who settled in the region got the big windfall of
the more than doubling of wheat prices. It was, however, not all net gain. What the farmers
won on the upside they partially lost on the downside as prices declined after the war in a
readjustment of the world wheat market.
The more serious problem facing western wheat farmers is that they underestimated the
98 McDowell, Steel at the Sault, p. 65, reports that by 1916-17 the Canadian steel manufacturers were reporting
handsome profits. Over the entire course of the war, however, Algoma steel lost money, and by 1921 Dominion
Steel was in receivership.
99 After 1920 commercial bankruptcies doubled for three years and the liabilities of bankrupt firms went up by
an even greater factor. The Dun and Bradstreet reports on bankruptcies are given in Canada Year Book, 1925.
100 By the census of 1911 34.3 per cent of gainful workers were at that time engaged in agricultural pursuits.
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hazards of specialized wheat production under the precarious conditions of a northerly, semi-
arid region. For several years they had poor crops. What this underscored was that the
Canadian economy was still strongly affected by supply conditions in agriculture. From 1918
until 1925 variations in wheat production played a prominent role in year to year changes in
Canadian national income. Had it not been for the misfortunes of the wheat farmers in those
years, Canadas recovery in the post-war period might not have been so slow. What cannot
reasonably be claimed is that the war induced an over-extension of reliance on production of
wheat for export. 
The other important sector of the Canadian economy was industrial. Prior to the war the
Canadian economy had been industrializing vigorously and with great success. Judged in terms
of per capita output of manufactured goods Canada had by 1913 become one of the most
industrial nations of the world. That development got seriously derailed by the war.
Regardless of some of the over-optimistic claims made by earlier writers, Canadian
industry made no long-term gains from the war. Instead, the distortion of the economy owing to
the war undermined and retarded industrial development. Canadas industrial contribution to
the war was narrow in focus and rather artificial. What it did was mainly to distract firms from
their intended lines of development and led them to engage in production in which they had no
established expertise. That firms such as Canadian General Electric and Canada Cement should
have devoted the war years to forging artillery shells is indicative. That Canadian industrial
firms were able to adapt as quickly as they did and perform as well as they did is a tribute to the
capability of Canadian manufacturers. Nevertheless, with few exceptions, the war experience
made no contribution to their long-run development.
Industrialization requires capital investment and the principal burden of the war for
Canadian industry was an extended reduction in investment. The savings that were available to
the economy were diverted to tool up munitions production. The rest of Canadian industry was
left severely undernourished for capital. It may not even have been able to avoid a depreciation
of its capital stock. 
Foreign supplies of capital, which had been so important before the war, were
completely cut off. There was no evident build-up of wartime profits to finance post-war
investment. Canadian businesses had to complete with the huge demands of the federal
government on domestic savings. They had to compete with a favorable rate of interest on
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government bonds coupled with patriotic urgings to buy those bonds. That continued well into
the post-war period. Investment continued at a low rate for far too long in Canada. What might
have been promising industrial development was thwarted. The shortfall was not just in
physical but also in human capital. The war arrested the education of Canadians and put a large
indent into the countrys accumulation of human capital. 
In the years after the war the development of Canadas industrial sector was severely
constrained at a time when it most needed to make a readjustment. In was unable to grow to
counterbalance the expanded agricultural sector. The western wheat economy had been
expanding before the war and continued to grow both through the war years and immediately
afterward. It has increased its weight in the national economy. The industrial sector was unable
to make comparable advances. It had to bear the burden of being diverted away from its
peacetime course of development and then to being hampered by lack of investment to recover
a structure more suited to peacetime growth. That was a direct outcome of the war. It left the
whole Canadian economy more dependent upon the precarious production of wheat for export.
An especially volatile activity gained in relative weight in the economy, and Canadians paid a
price for that. On the whole, then, it is more understandable why it was such an extended
struggle for Canada to recover after World War I. Economically, the war and the aftermath of
the war delivered the Canadian economy a severe blow, but for reasons that have not
previously been well understood nor explained.
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Figure 6: Real Wages, General and Manufacturing (1913=100)
